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NOTES
STATE STATUTES DEPRIVING STATE COURTS OF
JURISDICTION AS AFFECTED BY THE RULE OF
ERIE V. TOMPKINS*
The doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins" has by now been extended so
that such matters as burden of proof,2 conflict of laws rules,3 and statutes
of limitations4 are "substantive" law binding the federal courts to follow
state rules in diversity cases. Recently, in Angel v. Bullingtonc the Supreme
Court made a further extension of the Erie rule: a state statute which denies
to all state courts jurisdiction over a particular cause of action is "substan-
tive" and, if constitutional, will preclude the federal courts sitting in that
state from exercising jurisdiction. The case also presents an application of
the doctrine of res judicata which, combined with the Erie rule, led to two
dissenting opinions.
7
The case arose out of an attempt by Bullington, a Virginia resident, to
collect from Angel, a North Carolina resident, the balance of the purchase
price of Virginia land sold to Angel in 1940 and covered by a series of notes
secured by a deed of trust. Upon default in one of the notes, Bullington,
acting upon an acceleration clause in the deed, caused the trustees to sell the
land. The proceeds of the sale being insufficient to pay off the notes, Bul-
lington brought suit in a North Carolina state court to collect the deficiency 8
Although a judgment was awarded to Bullington in the trial court, the Su-
*Angel v. Bullington, 67 Sup. Ct. 657 (1947). The opinion of the circuit court of
appeals, 150 F.2d 679 (C.C.A. 4th 1945) has been noted in 21 IND. L. J. 223, 24 N.C.L.
REv. 267, and 13 U. op Ci. L. REv. 195 (1946).
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318
U.S. 109 (1943).
3. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941) ; Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U.S.
487 (1941).
4. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), established the rule as to equity
cases; it has long been held that state statutes of limitations bind the federal courts in
cases at law. 1 MfooaR's FED. PR.cricE 240-5 (1938).
5. For an excellent discussion of the general problem of "substance" v. "procedure"
as well as the problem under the Eric doctrine, see Coox, TrE LoGicAL AND LEGAL BAsEs
OF THE CoxFLIc OF LAws c. ,VI (1942).
6. 67 Sup. Ct 657 (1947).
7. Mr. Justice Reed and Mr. Justice Rutledge wrote dissenting opinions, in each of
which Mr. Justice Jackson joined.
8. The land was sold at a total price of $11,000, which included an agreement by
Angel to assume payment of an F.H.A. loan amounting to $7,400. Angel paid $500 of the
total amount due before defaulting. At the trustee sale, which occurred three months after
the original transaction, Bullington purchased the land for $25, plus, of course, the obliga-
tion to repay the F.H.A. loan. In his suit, he sought a deficiency judgment of 1$3,100.
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preme Court of North Carolina ordered the action dismissed," basing its de-
cision on a 1933 North Carolina statute which provides that "in all sales
of real property .. . [the holder of notes secured by a deed of trust] shall
not be entitled to a deficiency judgment ... ."1o The court rejected Bulling-
ton's claim that the statute violated the United States Constitution,"1 stating
that the statute, operating only to limit the jurisdiction of the state courts,
was related solely to the "adjective law of the State" and thus did not violate
the "substantive" provisions of the Constitution."
Bullington did not appeal the decision to the United States Supreme Court"'
but began a new suit for the deficiency in a North Carolina federal district
court. That court gave judgment for Bullington, and its decision was af-
firmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 14 The Supreme
Court, however, by a six to three vote, reversed the judgment.
The ambiguity of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion gives rise to
alternative explanations of the holding. Perhaps the simpler theory is that
the Court has formulated a new federal doctrine of res judicata, i.e., if a
court dismisses a cause of action because of a lack of jurisdiction, the whole
cause of action becomes res judicata'-a radical revision of the present rule
that only matters actually decided are res judicata in judgments not upon the
merits.16 This hypothesis seems highly questionable, for its logical implica-
tions seem too broad for the Court to accept.11 Furthermore, it is doubtful
9. Bullington v. Angel, 220 N.C. 18, 16 S.E.2d 411 (1941).
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-36 (1943).
11. It is not clear upon what doctrines Bullington relied; the only one specifically
mentioned in the North Carolina court's opinion is the full faith and credit clause. U.S.
CoNsT. Art. IV, § 1.
12. 220 N.C. 18, 20, 16 S.E.2d 411, 412 (1941). The court also rejected Bullington's
contention that the statute was not meant to include claims arising on land located outside
of North Carolina. Id. at 21, 16 S.E.2d at 413. While this interpretation of the statute is
questionable [See 13 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 196, 197-S (1946)] apparently no attempt was
made to raise the issue in the federal court proceedings. Any such attempt would have
failed, in view of the doctrine that, in applying the Erie rule, federal courts are bound by
an interpretation of a state statute made by the courts of that state. Moore v. Illinois Cen-
tral R. R., 312 U.S. 630 (1941); cf. Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YAsU
L.J. 762 (1941).
13. Bullington could have brought his case to the Supreme Court, not merely on
certiorari, but as a matter of right, under § 237 (a) of the Judicial Code, which provides
that a state court judgment upholding the validity of a state statute under the Federal
Constitution may be appealed to the Supreme Court. 43 STAT. 937 (1925), as amended, 45
STAT. 54 (1928), 28 U.S.C. § 344(a) (1940).
14. 56 F. Supp. 372 (W.D.N.C. 1944); 150 F.2d 679 (C.C.A. 4th 1945).
15. There is language in Mr. Justice Rutledge's dissenting opinion which indicates a
belief that the majority may have been basing its decision upon this theory. 67 Sup. Ct.
657 at 669.
16. Smith v. McNeal, 109 U.S. 426 (1883); Walden v. Bodley, 14 Pet. 156 (U.S.
1840) ; RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 49 (1942).
17. If, for example, a party erroneously attacked National Labor Relations Board ac-
tion in a federal district court, it seems most unlikely that the resultant dismissal of the
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that the Court would have repudiated the traditional rule of res judicata with-
out a discussion of the necessity for so doing, and without referring to any
of the Supreme Court cases' s which had helped to establish the doctrine.
The more plausible explanation is one which combines both more tradi-
tional res judicata and the Erie doctrine. A federal court, in diversity cases,
follows state rules of "substantive" law. A state statute denying jurisdiction
over a cause of action to all state courts expresses a state policy against the
prosecution of such causes of action; since failure to give effect to the statute
entails a "substantially different result," the statute is, therefore, "substan-
tive" under Erie,9 provided it is constitutional.2 0  The constitutionality of
the statute having been argued and decided in the North Carolina court, that
issue is res judicata, and cannot be raised anew in a collateral proceeding.
If it be assumed that the decision was based upon this last theory, there
seems little quarrel with the extension of the Eric rule.2 ' The Court justifi-
ably disregarded the North Carolina court's "procedural" characterization,
for a state's characterization is made for different purposes from those which
govern the application of the Erie doctrine.2 And the latter's aims are here
fulfilled because a statute banning deficiency judgments seems obviously to
reflect a state policy in behalf of debtors. The decision does require a change
in the rule of David Lupton.s Sons Co. v. Automobile Club of Amrlca,m
suit for want of jurisdiction would preclude a second suit in the proper forum, a circuit
court of appeals. 49 STAT. 455 (1935), as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 160(e) and cf. Myers v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1934). Likewise, if an OPA regulation or
order were erroneously challenged in a federal district court, it seems very doubtful that
dismissal of the suit for lack of jurisdiction would prevent a second suit in the proper court,
the Emergency Court of Appeals. 56 STAT. 33 (1942), as amended, 50 U.S.C. Arp. § 924
(d) (Supp. 1946) and see Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943).
18. See note 16 supra.
19. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941), made explicit only the test that the state
rule express a state policy while Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), made
explicit only the "substantially different result" test. Each case, however, rested on an im-
plicit assumption of the existence of both criteria.
20. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) ; cf. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S.
498 (1941).
21. It should be noted that if the case had involved matters arising under a fcdcral
statute, it might have been unnecessary to follow the state statute. See Clark, State Law
in the Federal Courts: The Brood ing Onmiprercnca of Eric v. Tomphins, 55 Ymn L.J.
267, 280-5 (1946).
22. The Erie policy is "so important to our federalism [that it] must be kept free
from entanglements with analytical or terminological niceties." Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945). See also Coor, op. cit. supra note 5, at 158-70.
23. 225 U.S. 489 (1912) (state statute depriving foreign corporations doing business
in state of privilege of access to state courts when they fail to comply with certain statu-
tory requirements does not deprive such corporation of access to federal court). The doc-
trine has often been applied in the lower federal courts. E.g., General Industries Co. V.
20 Wacker Drive Bldg. Corp., 156 F.2d 474 (C.C.A. 7th 1946) ; McLean v. York Oil Field
Supply Co., 138 F.2d 804 (C.C.A. 5th 1943) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Kane, 117 F.2d
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which held federal jurisdiction to be unaffected by state statutes closing all
state courts to certain types of proceedings. But, although termed "obso-
lete" 24 by the majority opinion, the Lupton doctrine seems only modified,
for-it is doubtful that all such statutes would be held "substantive" under the
Erie rule.25 Moreover, the Lupton rationale that federal jurisdiction can be
affected only by Congressional enactment remains intact, since a federal
court applying the Eric rule is acting pursuant to a federal statute, the Rules
of Decision Act. 26 In this respect, therefore, only the effect of the Lupton
398 (C.C.A. 7th 1941); RFC v. Barnett, 118 F.2d 190 (C.C.A. 7th 1941). But cf. Dia-
mond Glue Co. v. U.S. Glue Co., 187 U.S. 611 (1903).
24. 67 Sup. Ct. 657 at 662.
25. The crucial question in applying Erie to such a statute should be the determina-
tion of its purpose. For example, if such a statute were passed merely to clear crowded
dockets, it would seem anomalous to apply the Erie doctrine, and thus give more protec-
tion to residents and non-residents "doing business" in the state than the state legislature
intended. Such a statute also partakes of the character of the forum non conveniens doc-
trine and therefore should not be subject to Erie. See pp. 1045-6 infra. The decision in
Stephenson v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 110 F.2d 401 (C.C.A. 7th 1940), cert. granted,
310 U.S. 623 (1940), dismissed by agreement of the parties, 311 U.S. 720 (1940) may be
rationalized on either of these bases; but see Note, 35 ILL. L. Rav. 351, 354 (1940). The
same rationale will justify a decision like Wofford v. Prudential Ins. Co., 65 F. Supp. 637
(W.D.S.C. 1946); cf. Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898).
26. "The laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties, or statutes
of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." Rv.
STAT. § 721 (1875), 28 U.S.C. § 725 (1940). It should be noted that if the North Carolina
court had characterized the statute as one which abolished the cause of action, there would
have been no need for the federal court to consider the applicability of the Erie doctrine.
Long before the Erie case it had been settled that the act required federal courts to apply
state statutes affecting "substantive" rights (1 MooRE's FED. PRACTiCE 80-5 (1938)) but
not statutes which affected "jurisdiction" (the Lupton rule) or "equitable remedial
rights." See p. 1047 infra. The precise holding of the Erie case was that state rules of
comnwn law were also rules of decision for the federal courts but its effect has been to
strengthen the traditional doctrine that state statutes affecting "substantive" rights must
be applied by the federal courts. (See 1 MOORE'S FED. PRAcrlcE 56 (1946 Supp.)).
The instant case, in extending that rule to include certain "jurisdictional" statutes,
represents an example of the renewed force given to the rule by the Erie decision. State
statutes affecting "equitable remedial rights" may or may not be followed by the federal
courts. See pp. 1047-8 infra. It should also be noted that, except where a failure to do so
might produce a "substantially different result," the federal courts will follow the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Clark, supra note 21 at 288-90, and cases cited in note 27
infra.
It is also possible on another ground that the decision represents but a modification of
the LuptMon rule. Since the Rules of Decision Act was not intended to affect the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts, but only the rules of law which they apply, it would be more con-
sistent with the Act to contend that the effect of the North Carolina statute was to abolish
the cause of action in the North Carolina federal court, and not that the statute precluded
the federal court from taking jurisdiction. This conceptual distinction, however, appar-




rule has been changed,07 owing to the new interpretation of the Rules of De-
cision Act established by the Eric case.
2
8
With the Court's use of res judicata, however, trouble arises.
Admittedly, the decision can be justified by traditional res judicata doctrine.
The usual rule is that a judgment not "upon the merits" of a cause of action
is nevertheless conclusive as to any matters actually decided.2 Although not
"upon the merits" as commonly interpreted,30 the decision of the North
Carolina court may be regarded as having specifically held that the statute was
constitutional.3 And even if the decision be viewed as not having included
a specific finding of constitutionality, 2 it would have been logically necessary
for the North Carolina court to decide the constitutional issue raised by
Bullington before applying the statute to the case. To regard as res judicata
matters litigated and necessarily decided is to make but a slight extension, if
any, of the usual rule.
33
27. It would also appear that the precise holding of the Luptpon case has been changed
by the Bullingto, decision, despite FED. R. Crv. P. 17 (b), which provides that "the ca-
pacity of a corporation to sue,. . . [in a federal court] shall be determined by the la,
under which it was organized." But cf. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326
U.S. 438 (1946) [FED. R. Civ. P. 4 (f)]; Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (Faa.
R. Civ. P. 35 and 37).
28. The Budlington decision may be open to criticism on the ground that, by prevent-
ing uniformity among federal courts, it will hinder the development of uniformity in all
courts in the United States, state and federal. But, achieving such nation-wvide uniformity
seems unattainable in cases of this kind. History has shown that state courts have refused
to follow federal courts in creating a uniform national system of case law [Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938)], and it is even less likely that state legislatures would
be induced by a federal court rule granting relief in a certain cause of action to change
existing legislation which restricts or abolishes the right in state courts.
29. RESTATamENT, JUnn TrS § 49 (1942) ; see Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio & X. Ry.,
142 U.S. 396, 410 (1892); Bank of the United States v. Donally, 8 Pet. 361, 369 (U.S.
1834) ; see also 2 FRamaAN, JuDGiIExTs, 1530-3 (5th ed. 1925). If a judgment is upon the
merits of a cause of action, it is res judicata not only as to matters actually decided, but
as to all matters that could have been raised and decided. Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips,
274 U.S. 316 (1927); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 303 U.S. 371
(1940) ; cf. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
30. A judgment in a suit dismissed for vant of jurisdiction is not usually "upon the
merits." RESTATE ENT, JDhG mNTs § 194 (1942), and see 2 FnnAsx;, JuDxinTs 1567-8,
1604 (5th ed. 1925). But see note 33 infra.
31. The North Carolina court said "we cannot hold that this [statute] ... impinged
... the Constitution... !' 220 N.C. 18 at 20, 16 S.E.2d 411 at 412.
32. Mir. Justice Reed was of the opinion that the North Carolina court had not pur-
ported to decide the constitutional issue. 67 Sup. Ct. 657 at 664.
33. It is well settled that a judgment "upon the merits" is res judicata as to matters
necessarily decided. Grubb v. Public Utilities Comim'n, 281 U.S. 470 (1930) and see 2
FRAx, Ju nm,-rs 1462-8 (5th ed. 1925). There is no reason why such a rule should
not be equally applicable to a judgment not "upon the merits."
An alternative approach is to argue that the North Carolina court's decision was "on
the merits" of the jurisdictional question. See id. at 1532-3 and n. 16. If this concept be
adopted, the constitutional issue was then clearly res judicata whether the issue was "neces-
sarily decided" or merely "could have been raised and decided." See note 29 .spra.
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But the result of the application of these res judicata rules seems some-
what harsh . 4 Reasonably relying upon the Lupton case, Bullington forewent
an appeal of the constitutional issue to the Supreme Court 5 in favor of a
new suit in a federal court. After winning both in the district and circuit
courts, he was informed by the Supreme Court that he had erred in relying
on what was now declared to be "obsolete" doctrine; nor could he then raise
the constitutionality of the North Carolina statute, for this was res judicata.
And he could no longer appeal the North Carolina decision directly, the time
for appeal having long since expired8 0 The net result was to deprive Bul-
lington of a reasonable opportunity to secure an authoritative adjudication
of whether or not the North Carolina statute deprived him of his constitu-
tional rights
8 7
Certainly aware of this consequence, the Court might well have permitted
Bullington a second chance to argue the constitutionality of the statute.38 Two
34. "Policy" reasoning on another level can lead to a different conclusion. In view of
the facts of the case (see note 8 stpra) the court majority may have been intent upon pre-
venting a deficiency recovery rather than constructing a logical procedural edifice. This
would not represent a new approach to the airy concepts in this type of case. See Cavers,
A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REv. 173, 192-3 (1933). But it is
a highly conjectural hypothesis and this Note can do no more than suggest the possibility of
its existence.
35. It is difficult to predict what the Supreme Court would have decided as to the
constitutionality of the statute, had the issue been properly appealed to it. A number of
constitutional objections could have been made, of which the most important would have
been the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (U.S. CoxsT. AMmD. XIV, § 1)
and, if the cause of action could be said to rest upon a Virginia statute, e.g., NGOrTIAnL8
INsTRUmENTs LAW, VA. COD, c. 233 (1942), the full faith and credit clause. Recent
analogous cases involving these clauses have turned upon such vague standards as the
weight to be accorded "the governmental interests of each jurisdiction" (Alaska Packers
Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935)) and the existence of "a pub-
lic policy" of the forum sufficiently important to render constitutional its refusal to apply
the foreign law. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941). For discussion of the consti-
tutionality of the North Carolina statute, see 21 IND. L.J. 228, 229-31; 24 N.C.L. Rrv.
267, 272-4; 13 U. OF CHi. L. REv. 195, 200-1 (1946).
36. At most, a five month period was available. See 43 STAT. 940 (1925), as amended,
45 STAT. 54 (1928), 28 U.S.C. § 350 (1940). Since the North Carolina decision was en-
tered in September, 1941 and the Supreme Court decision was rendered in February 1947,
it was obviously impossible for Bullington to appeal the North Carolina decision at that
point.
37. "Compare, with the instant case, American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156
(1932) where it was held that the refusal of a state supreme court to permit an appeal,
because of a failure seasonably to comply with a procedural rule, did not constitute a de-
privation of due process, and thus did not justify a collateral attack upon the trial court
judgment in a federal court.
38. To permit a second attack upon the statute's constitutionality may be thought to
contradict the well-established Supreme Court policy of refusing to consider a constitu-
tional issue when there exists some other ground upon which a case can be decided. E.g.,
Municipal Investors Ass'n v. Birmingham, 316 U.S. 153 (1942) ; Berea College v. Ken-
tucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908); see also the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in
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lines of approach were available. The first would have been to exempt Bul-
lington from the retroactive repudiation of the Lupton rule, and declare that,
from that point forward, the Erie doctrine would be interpreted to include
statutes of the kind involved here. The use of this technique would not only
have produced a fairer holding, but would have found support in precedent.33
The second approach would have been for the Court to find that two sep-.
arate constitutional issues existed, only one of whichbecame res judicata by the
North Carolina decision. The first issue would have been whether a state
statute which denies to state courts jurisdiction to hear an action for a de-
ficiency judgment violates the Constitution. The North Carolina court's
negative answer to this question would have been res judicata. But that
court's decision was apparently founded on the theory that the statute merely
deprived Bullington of a forum, not of a right. Such theory became too
limited, however. If-as the Court majority actually decided-the statute
were also to be applied by the North Carolina federal court, Bullington
would have been deprived of any practical chance to secure a judgment. Thus
construed, the case presented a second constitutional issue--either the con-
stitutionality of the state statute when also applied by a federal court, or,
more probably, the constitutionality of the federal Rules of Decision Act
when so applied to a state statute as to deprive a mortgagee of a well-es-
tablished legal right.40 In either case, questions of full faith and credit and
due process would arise ;41 and, in either case, the problem-neither decided
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-8 (1936). Although such a policy may be generally
sound, it is questionable when applied so as to produce an inequitable result Cf. 87 U. PA.
L. REv. 610 (1939).
39. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 (U.S. 1863); see Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v.
Debolt, 16 How. 416, 432 (U.S. 1853) ; see also Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Over-
ru~li Decisions, 35 Ir. L. REv. 121, 130 and n. 101 (1940) ; cf. Great Northern Ry. v.
Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932). For discussion of the doctrine that
overruling decisions should not be applied retroactively, see Snyder, supra at 130-53, and
Radin, The Trail of the Calf, 32 Coma. L. Q. 137, 154-5 (1946). Compare, with the in-
stant case, Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940), where the court refused to apply the
doctrine of res judicata because of what it regarded as an overriding congressional policy;
see Boskey and Braucher, Jurisdiction and Collateral Attach, 40 Co.. L. Rnv. 1006, 1016-9
(1940).
40. If it is true that a state statute cannot affect the jurisdiction of a federal court
(see p. 1040 supra), and that it is the Rules of Decision Act that forces the federal court
to apply the state statute, it is conceptually difficult to hold that the state statute may be-
come unconstitutional by being applied by a federal court. It seems more logical to ques-
tion the constitutionality of the federal statute, when so applied.
No case has been found in which such an analysis of a constitutional issue has been
made, but it would appear that there was little need for making such a division. Often, a
state statute has been found unconstitutional as applied in the state court [e.g. Broderic: v.
Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935)] and there was no need to go on to inquire as to its effect in a
federal court. Furthermore, in none of these cases was there a need to protect a litigant
against the unfair application of standard rules of res judicata.
41. If the issue were the constitutionality of the state statute, questions of full faith
and credit, and of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment would arise; see note 35
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nor presented in the state court-could hardly be termed res judicata.42  Even
if the Erie rule is one which the Constitution requires,43 the second constitu-
tiorial question might still exist. There is, of course, strength in the argument
that when application of a statute is forced by the Constitution the statute is
rendered immune; but it is equally plausible to argue that such a constitu-
tional requirement would be subject to limitations imposed by other sections
of the Constitution, e.g., the Fifth Amendment and the full faith and credit
clause. In any event, the view that Erie has a constitutional basis is dubious,
at best.44 It does not seem unreasonable, therefore, to break up the question
of constitutionality into two issues.
Whether just or unjust, however, the holding in the Bullington case is not
so important as its possible effect on future decisions; but the lack of clarity
in the majority opinion makes prediction of the case's value as precedent as
hazardous as the interpretation of its rationale.
supra. If the issue were the constitutionality of the Rules of Decision Act, questions of
full faith and credit and of due process under the Fifth Amendment would be piesented.
As to the full faith and credit problem, see note 35 supra and cf. Bradford Electric Light
Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932). As to the due process issue, cf. Wright v. Union
central Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502 (1938) ; Louisville Bank v. Radford, 295 US. 555
(1935). It might also be possible to raise an issue under the Tenth Amendment. Cf.
Wright v. Union Central -Life Ins. Co., supra, at 516-8.
It has been held that Congress may withhold jurisdiction from any court created by
it, A power which extends to the federal district courts. Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U.S. 165
(1904) ; Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441 (U.S. 1850). However, it has been said that this
power is subject to constitutional limitations. See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co. 260 U.S.
226, 234 (1922).
42. Nor is it likely that the state court would have decided the issue had it been pre-
sented. Since it was unnecessary to do so, that court probably would have refused to
decide the applicability of a federal court rule, the Erie doctrine, to the statute, particu-
larly since an affirmative answer would have necessitated the court's facing another con-
stitutional issue.
If the argument that the jurisdictional decision was "on the merits" were employed,
(see note 33 stepra) the possibility of the second constitutional question being considered
res judicata, as a "matter which could have been raised and decided," is apparent. But, as
stated above, the North Carolina court would probably have been unwilling to decide the
question. And it is not unreasonable to predict in retrospect that the Supreme Court, had
it been faced with a direct appeal from the North Carolina judgment, might also have
refused to decide the question; this would have been in accord with its general policy of
restricting the use of constitutional doctrines, especially where the constitutional issue was
not raised below. Moreover, Bullington could well have relied on the doctrine of "option"
to litigate an unraised matter in a second suit. See 2 FREEM AN, JUDGMENTS, 1424 (5th ed.
1925).
43. In the Erie case, Mr. Justice Brandeis stated that neither Congress nor the fed-
eral courts had any power to declare substantive rules of common law to be applied in
federal courts. 304 U.S. 64 at 78-80.
44. Mr. Justice Brandeis' dictum in the Erie case did not command the support of all
of the majority justicds at the time and seems to have been carefully avoided by the Court
ever since. Moreover, his statement appears to have been generally criticized by the com-
mentators. See Clark, mipra note 21, at 273 and n. 27, 278-9 and n. 49.
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As to res judicata, it would appear that the Court intended to make no
change in existing doctrine.45 However, since it is possible to interpret the
decision as making such a change,40 it may not be unreasonable to anticipate
deviational decisions in the lower federal courts. One thing is clear: the Su-
preme Court apparently will not hesitate to apply the rule of res judicata to
a litigant who fails to take advantage of his chance for a direct appeal on a
constitutional issue. 
7
The case may also lead to other extensions of the Eric rule. It might, for
example, presage a holding that forum non conveniens is "substantive", a
question left open by the Supreme Court.48 There is some analog, between
a state legislative policy of the kind involved in the Bidlington case and a state
judicial policy of refusal to exercise jurisdiction in a case involving a for-
eign cause of action and one or more non-resident parties when to do so
would seriously inconvenience the court or be vexatious or oppressive to a
non-resident party.
The policy considerations underlying the Eric doctrine, however, do not
justify its application to forum non conveniens rules. For perhaps the basic
purpose of the Erie doctrine is to prevent different legal treatment of parties
merely because there is a variation in the residence of their opponents.P Thus,
in a case not involving a forum non conveniens problem, if a federal court
were free to apply its own rules of substantive law, the rights of two resident
plaintiffs might vary according to the purely fortuitous circumstance of
45. Since the Court apparently believed that there was but one constitutional issue, its
decision was probably based upon the usual rule of res judicata stated in the text. See
p. 000 supra. Nor does the case indicate how the Court would decide the issue of whether
state rules of res judicata are "substantive" under the Eric doctrine, a question left open
in Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726 (1946).
46. See p. 1041 supra.
47. Cf. Grubb v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470 (1930). In that case, which
involved the constitutionality of an order of the defendant Commission the plaintiff failed
to appeal from a state supreme court declsion (which was on the merits) upholding the
order, but continued to press a collateral attack upon the order in a federal court. Upon
appeal from the federal court, the Supreme Court held that the entire matter became rcs
judicata by the state court's decision.
This policy is also in accord with the Court's disapproval of an attempt to raise, for
the firs thime, constitutional issues in a collateral suit. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v.
Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
48. In Koster v. Lumbermen's lut. Casualty Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 828, 834 (1947) and
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 67 Sup. Ct. 839, 843 (1947), the Court found it unnecessary to
decide the question, since the state rule was the same as the federal rule. The trend in
the lower federal courts appears to be toward characterizing the doctrine as "procedural,"
and hence not subject to the Eric rule. Koster v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 153
F.2d 888 (C.C.A. 2d 1946) aff'd on other grounds 67 Sup. Ct. 828 (1947) ; Gilbert v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 153 F.2d 883 (C.C.A. 2d 1946) rev'd on other grounds 67 Sup. Ct. 839 (1947) ;
see Overfield v. Pennroad Corp., 113 F.2d 6 (C.C.A. 3d 1940). Contra: WVeiss v. Routh,
149 F.2d 193 (C.C.A. 2d 1945).
49. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-7 (1938). And see Shulman, The Demise
of Swift v. Tyson, 47 YAs. L.J. 1336, 1347 (1938).
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whether their opponents were residents, or non-residents upon whom service
could be had. A resident plaintiff whose opponent was a resident would be
limited to the state courts; a resident plaintiff whose opponent was a non-
resident upon whom service could be had could take advantage of the differ-
ent rules obtaining in the federal forum. Since the nere difference in res-
idence of the defendants is an insufficient reason for different legal treatment
of the plaintiffs, the Erie rule is necessary.0 In a case involving a forum non
conveniens problem, however, there may be sound reasons for different treat-
ment: serious inconvenience to the non-resident defendant or the court, and
the probability that federal courts would accord fairer treatment to non-
residents claiming inconvenience of forum.5 ' No unjust discrimination would
result,5 2 for the disparity is based upon something more than a difference in
residence.
53
Conceivably, the Bullington case might also be used as a precedent for
characterizing as "substantive" under Erie a state statute giving exclusive
jurisdiction of a certain cause of action to a particular state court."4 But,
50. This reasoning would of course apply with equal force to cases where the non-
resident was a plaintiff.
51. Since the purpose of giving federal courts diversity jurisdiction was to prevent
non-resident parties from being-subjected to the possibility of local prejudice, [see Bank
of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 87 (U.S. 1809)], and since such prejudice
could easily arise in a case where a non-resident claims inconvenience of forum, it is de-
sirable that federal courts be free to apply their own rule of forum non conveniens.
52. Admittedly, some discrimination would still exist. For example, if the amount in
controversy did not exceed the requisite $3,000, a resident plaintiff whose opponent was a
non-resident would be limited to the state courts, where a different forum non conveniens
rule might be applied.
53. Of course, the failure to apply Erie to the rule may produce non-uniformity within
a state, but the elimination of discrimination rather than the achievement of uniformity, is
the basic philosophy, underlying Erie; see note 49 supra.
It has also been suggested that requiring federal courts to apply state rules of forum
non conveniens might seriously affect their trial convenience and dockets. See 1 Moona's
FmD. PRAcricE 84 (1946 Supp.).
54. The existing rule is that such statutes do not affect the jurisdiction of federal
courts. Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425 (U.S. 1868) ; Union Bank v. Jolly's Adm'rs, 18 How.
503 (U.S. 1855); Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33 (1909);
Blacker v. Thatcher, 145 F.2d 255 (C.C.A. 9th 1944), cert. denied 324 U.S. 848 (1945);
Miami County Nat. Bank v. Bancroft, 121 F.2d 921 (C.C.A. 10th 1941) (statutes giving
exclusive jurisdiction of suits against executors and administrators to state probate
courts) ; Cf. Vanderwater v. City Nat. Bank, 28 F. Supp. 89 (E.D. Ill. 1939) ; Peterson v.
Demmer, 34 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Tex. 1940) (suit removed to federal court from state
probate court given exclusive jurisdiction by state statute). A case like Suydam v. Broad-
nax, 14 Pet. 67 (U.S. 1840), usually cited in support of this proposition, seems of doubtful
weight, since it involved a state non-claims statute, which would seem to fall under the
rule established by the York case (state statute of limitations is "substantive" under Eric
doctrine) ; Cf. Dombrowski v. Dunn, 69 F. Supp. 42 (D.Vt. 1946) (state non-claims statute
applied without mention of Erie doctrine). Another line of cases in support of the doctrine
is: Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529 (1893) (statute limiting actions against a
county to county court of defendant county) ; City of Hollis ex rel. Kearn v. Carrell, 42
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since such a statute, unlike the North Carolina statute in the instant case,
does not deprive all state courts of jurisdiction, the mere exercise of jurisdic-
tion by a federal court will not produce a "substantially different result" and,
therefore, the Erie rule seems inapplicable."
However, the instant case may be of real importance as a precedent in
clearing away what remains of the equitable remedial rights doctrine,"" i.e.,
that a federal court is bound to follow state law as to equitable "substantive
rights" but not as to equitable "remedies."' 7  For example, a state statute al-
lowing an unsecured simple contract creditor of an insolvent corporation to
apply for a receiver before reducing his claim to judgment is not enforceable
in a federal court, because it confers a mere "remedial right; ' r,8 on the other
hand, a state statute authorizing a claimant out of possession of vacant land
to bring a suit to quiet title against his rivals is enforceable in a federal court
since it creates a "substantive right."' 9
Although much criticized by commentators GO and somewhat narrowed by
the York decision,61 the doctrine was still given approval in the York case,'-
and it is being applied by many lower federal courts.P The instant case es-
F. Supp. 893 (W.D. Okla. 1941) (statute limiting action on paving bonds to state court) ;
Chicago & NAV. Ry. v. Whitton's Adm'r, 13 Wall. 270 (U.S. 1871) (wrongful death
statute permitting recovery in state courts only). Cf. Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257
U.S. 529 (1922) (statute revoking foreign corporation's license to do business if it sought
the jurisdiction of a federal court held unconstitutional).
55. It is, of course, possible that the supposed absence of local bias in a federal court
might produce a "substantially different result" than if the same suit were maintained in
a state court. But, the possibility of this result does not justify the application of the Eric
doctrine, since the very purpose of giving federal courts diversity jurisdiction was to pre-
vent non-resident suitors from being subjected to the possibility of local prejudice. See
Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 87 (U.S. 1809).
56. Since, however the Bullington case was an action at laxw, [Noonan v. Lee, 2
Black 499 (U.S. 1862)], while the rule under discussion involves suits in equity, the value
of the Bullhngfon case as a precedent may be somewhat weakened.
57. For a comprehensive discussion of this doctrine, see Comment, 55 YAMZ L. J. 401
(1946). Properly included within the scope of the doctrine is the rule that a state statute
which creates an adequate remedy at law in a state court, and hence bars an equitable
remedy in a state court, will not affect the "equity jurisdiction" of a federal court in that
state. For a discussion of this rule see id. at 406-7. While this rule has been stated to be
one relating to the "jurisdiction" of federal courts (Ibid.) it would appear that it is more
properly classified as a part of the equitable remedial rights doctrine. "Equity jurisdic-
tion" refers to the propriety of granting equitable relief, while "jurisdiction" per se relates
to the power of a court to hear and determine a cause. See 1 Mooans FED. PnAcrxcc 186
(1938).
58. Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491 (1923).
59. Holland v. Challen, 110 U.S. 15 (1884).
60. See Comment, 55 YALE L. J. 401, 416-20 (1946) ; 1 Moon's FED. Pmcrzcn 56-8,
114 (1946 Supp.).
61. The case held that state statutes of limitations must be followed by a federal court
in an "equity" suit.
62. 326 U.S. at 105-8, 112.
63. See Comment, 55 YAIm. L. J. 401, 402, 419-20 (1946).
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tablishes the rule that a state statute denying "jurisdiction" over a cause of
action to all state courts, if constitutional, is binding upon the federal courts
sitting in that state. Consistency would appear to demand that a state statute
regulating the equitable "remedies" which all state courts are authorized to
give should be equally binding upon the federal courts. But more than logic
is involved. Both rules are concerned with the same policy consideration:
the effect that a federal court should give to a state statute which substantially
affects the enforcement of legal rights in state courts. And both, therefore,
deserve the same treatment.
On balance, while the holding in the Bullington case appears open to ques-
tion" and its effects on res judicata uncertain, the extension made of the
Erie rule seems desirable and may prove of value as a precedent in eliminating
some of the obsolete doctrine relating to the powers of federal courts.
DISCHARGE BASED ON UNION REPRISAL FOR SUPPORT OF
RIVAL UNION UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT
ALTHOUGH labor agreements requiring union membership as a condition of
employment' are expressly permitted by the National Labor Relations Act-
discharge of employees expelled from a union can be designated an unfair
practice under NLRB policy. This policy, initiated in 1942, 3 terms the dis-
64. But gee note 34 supra.
1. The essential characteristic of such contracts, for the purpose of this Note, is that
they require the employer to discharge at union request any employee excluded, expelled
or suspended from the contracting union. There are almost 11,000,000 workers subject to
such provisions. N.Y. Times, April 21, 1947, p. 3, col. 3. See also Summers, The Right
to Join a Union, 47 COL. L. REv. 33, 42 (1947) ; The Question of Outlauing the Closcd
Shop, 26 CONG. DIG. 33, 40 (1947); EXTENT OF COLLECrVE BARGAINING AND U1Non
REcoGNiTION, 1945 BuRaAu LaOR STATisTcs BULL. No. 865 (1946). Such contracts may
provide for hiring only those already union members (closed shop), for all those hired to
become union members within a certain time period (union shop), for those employees who
indicate they are union members at the beginning of the labor agreement to remain union
members in good standing (maintenance-of-membership), or for a preference to be given
union members in hiring, which would be equivalent to the closed shop as long as the union
is able to supply the employer's entire labor needs.
The Effects of the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 15 U.S.L.
W=F.c 117 (June 23, 1947), have not been considered in this Note.
2. Section 8 (3) of the Act, hereafter cited by section only. 49 STAT. 449, 452
(1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (3) (1940), quoted note 22 infra.
3. Rutland Court Owners, Inc., 44 N. L. R. B. 587 (1942), aff'd on rehcaring, 46
N. L. R. B. 1040 (1943). Two weeks prior to the termination of the labor agreement,
the employees in question made evident their desire for a change in the bargaining repre-
sentative. The incumbent union, holding a closed shop contract, requested and obtained
their discharge. The employees were ordered reinstated with back pay. Board Member
[Vol. 561048
NOTES
charge an unfair practice when the employer had prior noticO that the union
expelled the employee in retaliation for his support of a rival union during the
"appropriate time"' ; for a change in employee representation.0 Apparently
Leiserson dissented on the ground that the discharges were in fulfillment of a contract
valid under the Act; if an injustice had been done, it was for Congress and not the
Board to act. Rutland Court Owners, Inc., 44 N. L. R. B. 587, 603 (1942).
In another 1942 decision basic to the subject policy, the Board found that an employer
could not discharge employees under a closed shop contract, when he signed the contract
with the knowledge that those employees would not be admitted to the union. Monsieur
Henri Wines, Ltd., 44 N. L. R. B. 1310 (1942).
This issue had apparently not directly arisen prior to 194?. In Ansley Radio Corp.,
18 N. L. R. B. 1028 (1939), it was held to be an unfair labor practice for the employer
to discharge in anticipation of the union's expulsion of the employees, where the union
had not yet acted; but cf. United Fruit Co., 12 N. L. R. B. 404 (1939) ; Taylor Milling
Corp., 26 N. L. R. B. 424 (1940). The latter two cases were overruled in Federal Engi-
neering Co., 60 N. L. R. B. 592, 593 n. 1 (1945), enforced in this respcct, 153 F2d 233
(C.C.A. 6th 1946). In American-West African Lines, Inc., 21 N. L R. B. 691 (1940),
the firm was ordered to grant a competing union access to the ships equal to that granted
the incumbent union, despite a dosed shop agreement.
For a discussion of these cases, see Note, Effect of Closed Shop Contract on Em-
ployer Practices Otherwise Unfair Under the NLRA, 56 HAav. L. Rnv. 613 (1943);
Mlurdock, Some Aspects of Employee Democracy Under the Wagner Act, 32 Com.. L. Q.
73, 92-5 (1946).
4. Lack of knowledge by the employer excuses him. Diamond T Motor Car Co.,
64 N. L. R B. 1225 (1945) (employer not obligated to make inquiries) ; Spicer Mfg.
Corp., 70 N. L. R. B. 41 (1946) (knowledge of foreman not imputed to employer, unless
employee specifically requests that employer be informed) ; but cf. Lewis Meier & Co.,
72 N. L. R. B. No. 106 (April 24, 1947) (where employer is advised by rival union of
possible reprisals against its adherents, he has duty to inquire of expellees whether they
are delinquent in dues as incumbent union charges); Colgate-Palmolive-Pect Co., 70
N. L. R B. 1202 (1946) (employer should have realized, from his general ktowledge
of the unions' rivalry, and the fact that 37 employees had been suspended-not yet ex-
pelled-that the discharges reflected reprisals for union activity).
5. "The employees' right to select representatives to be meaningful must neces-
sarily include the right at some appropriate time to change representatives:' Rutland
Court Owners, Inc., 44 N. L. FL B. 587, 596 (1942). The "appropriate time" concept
represents the Board's balance between the objectives of industrial stability and in-
dividual freedom implicit in. § 1 of the Act. The "appropriate time" occurs toward the
end of the life of the labor agreement. A recent comprehensive discussion of the circum-
stances under which the Board may regard the time for questioning a union's certifica-
tion to be appropriate is Cushman, The Duration of Certifications by the National Labor
Relations Board and the Doctrite of Administrative Stability, 45 Mficir. L. REY. 1 (1946).
See also Murdock, supra note 3, at 75-S3, 98-9; Comment, 51 YA. L. J. 465 (1942).
Compare International Shoe Co., 71 N. L. R. B. No. 207 (Dec. 31, 1946), uith Housting
Packing Co., 71 N. L. R. B. No. 195 (Dec. 19, 1946); See Lewis Meier & Co., supra
note 4. The Board's current policy is to protect the union's certification from chal-
lenge for as long a contract period as two years. Reed Roller Bit Co., 72 N. L. R. B.
No. 157 (Feb. 26, 1947).
It is the time of the individual's activity that is the relevant consideration, and not
the time of the expulsion. Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 65 N. L R. B. 1 (1945)
(employee's activity a few months after signing of contract is valid ground for expul-
sion and discharge; if the activity had been directed toward a change at the appropriate
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approved by the Supreme Court's 1944 decision in Wallace Corporation v.
NLRB, 7 the policy has recently been reviewed by three circuit courts and is
headed for another Supreme Court test.8
In the three cases, involving findings of unfair labor practice and orders of
reinstatement with back pay, two circuits upheld the Board and one, in effect,
ruled against it. In Local No. 2880, Lumber & Sawmill Workers v. NLRB,
the expelled union member had acted as an observer for the losing union at
an NLRB election; the Ninth Circuit decreed enforcement of the Board
order. The Board was upheld also by the Second Circuit in NLRB v. Ameri-
can White Cross Laboratories,0 where the expellee, the leader of the oppos-
ing union movement, had testified at a Board hearing held to determine
whether an election should be ordered. The Seventh Circuit, however, by
implication ruled against the Board in Aluminum Company of America v.
NLRB,n which also involved an expulsion for rival union activity; there the
court, ruling that a maintenance of membership contract was still in effect,
vacated the Board's order with only incidental discussion of the instant issue,
Having become something of a touchstone in these cases, the Wallace opin-
ion's deserves analysis. A history of bitter company opposition to the CIO
time rather than immediately, the decision might have been otherwise. See pp. 5-6);
The Cliffs Dow Chemical Co., 64 N. L. R. B. 1419 (1945) (postponing discharge until
after the election does not excuse a charge of unfair practice based on knowledge of
union reprisal for activities during the "appropriate time").
6. Where the two requirements of notice and "appropriate time" are met, there is an
unfair practice. 11 N. L. R. B. ANN. REl. 42 (1947); Rheem Mfg. Co., 70 N. L. R. B.
57 (1946) (it is irrelevant that expellees, as shop committee members, owed union greater
loyalty) ; Eureka Vacuum Cleaner Co., 69 N. L. R. B. 878 (1946) (union threat to evict
employees forcefully no justification).
It should be noted that the policy does not abrogate the closed shop contract. Ex-
pulsions for any cause but dual unionism, and also for that cause where the activity does
not occur during the "appropriate time," are not affected. NLRB v. McGough Bakeries
Corp., 153 F.2d 420 (C. C. A. 5th 1946) (failure to pay union dues valid ground for dis-
charge) ; Southwestern Portland Cement Co., supra note 5; Utica & Mohawk Cotton
Mills, Inc., 51 N. L. R. B. 257 (1943) (employees who indicate their desire to withdraw
from the union and are subsequently expelled, may be discharged); ef. Hall Freight
Lines, Inc., 65 N. L. R. B. 397 (1946).
For general discussion of Board policy on discharges for "appropriate time" activ-
ity, see 2 TsLLER, LABOR DisPUmS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING § 324 (1940 and Cum.
Supp. 1946).
7. 323 T.,S. 248 (1944).
8. Petiti. f E .ertiorari in Local No. 2880, Lumber & Sawmill Workers v.
NLRB, 158 F. d -65 (C. C. A. 9th 1946), has been granted. 15 U. S. L. WEER 3420
(1947).
9. 158 F.f- 865 (C. C. A. 9th 1946), enforcing 64 N. L. R. B. 159 (1945).
10. 160 F2-d.75 (C. C. A. 2d 1947), enforcing 66 N. L. R. B. 866 (1946).
11. 159 .2-d523 (C. C. A. 7th 1946), revrsing 68 N. L. R. B. 750 (1946).
12. Wal:Jre oip. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944), aflrmig 141 F.2d 87 (C. C. A.
4th 1944), eufovi-ing 50 N. L. R. B. 138 (1943), rehearing denied, 324 U.S. 885 (1945).
This was a 5-4 decision; the majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice Black, the
dissent by Mr. Justice Jackson. The two members of the Court not on the present bench,
Chief Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Roberts, joined in the dissent.
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climaxed in a strike and the formation of an independent union. At the inter-
vention of the Board, the Wallace Company signed a consent agreement
promising not to interfere with either union and to grant a closed shop con-
tract to the one winning the Board election. The independent won, and, be-
fore the contract was signed, informed the employer that it was planning to
exclude from its membership 43 employees who had been most active for the
CIO. Despite this knowledge, the company signed the closed shop contract
and, at the request of the union, discharged the 43. The discharges were
claimed to be unfair labor practices and, after investigation, the Board so
held, finding also that the independent had been company-dominated prior to
the consent agreement. Its resulting order, reinstating the employees vith
back pay and disestablishing the independent union, was upheld by the Court.
At first blush the circumstances of the Wallace case may be distinguished
from those in the principal cases in at least two respects. The first is that the
employers in the current cases had no knowledge of the union's intentions
when they signed the labor agreements. The validity of this distinction, how-
ever, is minimized in that the Wallace Company was merely following in good
faith13 the terms of the consent agreement, made with no knowledge that the
winning union would demand discharge of rival adherents. Moreover, Board
policy requiring only that employers have notice of the basis of the union's
action before discharging raises the possibility of the discharge being held a
violation ;14 thus, the state of mind of the employer when he makes the dis-
charges rather than when he signs the contract would appear the appropriate
criterion.'5 The second distinction is that the Wallace case involved a com-
13. The majority opinion said there was no "conspiracy," Wallace Corp. v. NLRB,
323 U. S. 248, 252-3 (1944), while the dissent emphasized the positive good faith of the
employer, id. at 260-4, 266-7, 272.
14. See note 4 sprpa.
15. Thus, the principal cases would seem similar to the earlier ones in which the
policy was established, see note 3 suPra, although the Local 28S0 case was apparently
the first in which a discharge was held an unfair practice when the employer acted oficr
the signing of the new valid labor agreement. For a discussion emphasizing this dis-
tinction, see Frieden, Some New Discharge Problens Under Union Security Coverants,
(1946) Wis. L. REv. 440, 445-6, 449-50, the author stating that the Board has adhered
to a good faith test in alleging unfair practice, so that employers might be excused on the
plea that they were merely obeying valid contracts. It would seem more accurate, how-
ever, to say that where the Board finds a violation of the Act, the good faith of the em-
ployer is considered irrelevant. NLRB v. Gluek Brewing Co., 144 F.2d 847 (C. C. A.
8th 1944); NLRB v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 128 F.2d 528 (C. C. A. 6th 1942); Mc-
Quay-Norris Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 748 (C. C. A. 7th 1940); NLRB v. Star
Publishing Co., 97 F.2d 465 (C. C. A. 9th 1938); Greer Steel Co., 38 N. L. R. B. 65
(1942) ; Cape Cod Trawling Corp., 23 N. L. R. B. 203 (1940). Contra: Newv York &
Porto Rico S.S. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 1028 (1941) ; McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 19 N.L.R.B.
778 (1940).
That the Board might have found a legitimate ground for the discharge does not
prevent it from reaching a finding of unfair practice. NLRB v. Nevada Consolidated
Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105 (1942).
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pany dominated union ;16 however, this is no more logical than the first. Board
policy, judicially upheld,17 excuses all violations prior to the signing of a con-
sent agreement-if there are no subsequent violations.18 , Thus the Wallace
discharges per se had to be considered an unfair practice before the question
of company domination could arise; the Wallace case, therefore, seems deci-
sive of the issues argued in the later cases.19
The Wallace case, with the Local 2880 and White Cross decisions which
cite it," represents a preference for the right of workers to designate a bar-
16. Much of the comment on the case indicates that this is considered sufficient to
distinguish the Wallace holding from cases, like the principal ones, in which there is an
independent union. See Notes, 160 A. L. R. 918, 930, 931 n.16 (1946), 40 ILI. L. Rrv.
149, 150, 152 (1945), 43 MicE. L. Ray. 819, 820 (1945), 3 NAT. B. J. 148, 153-4 (1945).
But see Note, 58 HAgv. L. PRay. 448, 452-3 (1945) ; "In the light of the holding in the
Wallace Corp. case, caution would seem to dictate that an employer secure assurances
from a union seeking a union shop contract that such contract shall not be used to dis-
criminate against members of a rival union or to secure the discharge of existing em-
ployees." 2 TEuLm, op. cit. supra note 6, at 95 (Cum. Supp. 1946).
17. Canyon Corp. v. NLRB, 128 F.2d 953, 955-6 (C. C. A. 8th 1942) ; NLRB
v. Hawk & Buck Co., 120 F.2d 903, 905 (C. C. A. 5th 1941). Since estoppel does not
apply against an administrative agency, the Board may, if it pleases, disregard any such
agreement. NLRB v. Phillips Gas & Oil Co., 141 F.2d 304 (C. C. A. 3rd 1944).
18. American Bakeries Co., 51 N. L. R. B. 937 (1943) ; Corn Products Refining Co.,
22 N. L. R. B. 824, 828-9 (1940) ; Wickwire Bros., 16 N. L. R. B. 316, 325-6 (1939) ;
Hope Webbing Co., 14 N. L. R. B. 55, 75-6 (1939); Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 12
N. L. R. B. 568, 577-9 (1939) ; Shenandoah-Dives Mining Co., 11 N. L. R. B. 885, 888
(1939). While the Board need not so limit itself, see note 17 supra, in practice it looks
behind consent agreements only where there has been a subsequent violation of the Act.
Locomotive Finished Material Co., 52 N. L. R. B. 922, 927 (1943); Harry A. Halff,
16 N. L. R. B. 667, 681-2 (1939); cf. Chicago Casket Co., 21 N. L. IL 3. 235, 252-6
(1940).
For recognition and approval of this practice in the Wallace decisions, see 323 U.S.
at 253-5, 256-7 [at 255: "Consequently, since the Board correctly found that there was
a subsequent unfair labor practice, it was justified in considering evidence as to peti-
tioner's conduct, both before and after the settlement and certification." (emphasis
added)]; and 141 F.2d at 90, 91.
19. Another possible distinction is that the principal cases involve expulsion, whereas
the Wallace case involves original exclusion, the possible argument being that an em-
ployee already a member knows the penalties for disloyalty from the union's constitu-
tion and by-laws and from the labor agreement. See, e.g., Southwestern Portland Cement
Co., 65 N. L. R. B. 1, 8 (1945) ; Brief for Petitioners, pp. 80-1, Local No. 2880, Lumber
& Sawmill Workers v. NLRB, 158 F.2d 365 (C. C. A. 9th 1946). The distinction ap-
pears invalid as to both the union and the employer. In either case, expulsion or ex-
clusion, the union feels past conduct is so disloyal that future loyalty is too great a risk.
That the employer must have notice (see note 4 supra) obviates the relevance of the
distinction in so far as it is to excuse a charge of unfair practice. Compare Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) (NLRA covers applicants as well as employees);
Peerless Pattern Works, 64 N. L. R. B. 1473 (1945) (failure to re-hire because of fear
of union reprisal is unfair practice).
20. Only the White Cross case accepts the Wallace decision as binding. 160 F.2d, at 77.
The Local 2880 opinion found the Wallace case only "supported" the instant policy, 158
F.2d at 368. The Aluminum Co. opinion considered the Wallace case "admittedly ...
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gaining representative over the right of unions to discipline their members.21
No clear choice between these opposing considerations is specifically made by
the Labor Relations Act but resolution of the conflict seems apparent on
analysis. The power to sign a contract making union membership a condition
of employment, while broadly stated, is merely permitted, 2 but freedom to
designate representatives is expressly promoted ;2 it would thus seem con-
trary to the Act's purpose to condone petrifaction of the bargaining agent.
Yet that would appear to be the practical result were employees to know that
any overt effort directed toward a change in union representation might lead
to loss of their jobs. Under agreements making union membership a condi-
tion of employment, the danger that certification permanent for all practical
purposes will make unions unresponsive to their members' needs appears
more substantial than the danger of ultimately weakening trade unionism. 2-
inapplicable if the discharge is pursuant to an existent closed-shop agreement untainted
by any unfair labor practice [in terms of company domination] .... it strains the imagi-
nation to see where in the Act Congress has intended that the discharges made pursuant
to a valid union security contract should in themselves constitute an unfair labor prac-
tice." 159 F.2d at 526.
21. The choice is not a simple one. While a discharge under the instant circumstances
does seem undemocratic, a strong case for the union power may be based on the ac-
credited role of collective bargaining in our economy, and the general disinclination of
the courts to "meddle" in internal union affairs. See note 26 infra. For succinct state-
ments of the problem see Mrz, LABOR PoLTCY oF THE ttumDAL GovEa._=;T 150-1, 165,
169-70 (1945) ; A.rmscA.4, Cwvm LBETms Uxiox, Dnaoccy ni TR.z UMnos 23-9
(1943).
22. Section 8 (3) of the Act provides that "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer. .. . By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or an'v) term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organi-
zation: Provided, That iwtlzing in this Act ... or in any other statute of the Unitcd
States, shall prechude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization
(not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this Act as an unfair
practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 9 (a), in the
appropriate collecting bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made." (emphasis
added).
23. The declared policy of the Act is to protect "the exercise by workers of fulU
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing.. ." (emphasis added), § 1, and the Act grants "Employees... the right to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations . . ." (emphasis added), § 7.
The right to file charges and give testimony under the Act, the method of support
of a rival union leading to expulsion in the White Cross case, is dignified by a separate
subsection, § 8(4).
Moreover, the Board has been upheld in ordering elections despite the existence of
valid collective agreements. See, e.g., Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. NLRB, 104 F.2d 49,
55 (C. C. A. 8th 1939) ; NLRB v. Hollywood-Maxwell Co., 126 F2d 815, 820 (C C. A.
9th 1942); cf. Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U. S. 702 (1944); NLRB v. Electric
Vacuum Cleaner Co., 315 U. S. 685 (1942); Motor Valve & Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 149
F.2d 247 (C. C. A. 6th 1945).
24. "If a collective bargaining contract, especially one for a closed shop, is deemed
to belong to the union and not to the men, then a temporary majority may give the
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Nor does the right to request an employee's discharge when he has supported
the rival union during the relatively brief "appropriate time" seem essential to
the performance of the union's role of bargaining representative or to the
value of union security contracts.
25
A desirable goal, however, should not render inviolate the means employed:
the Wallace case may control but it may not be wise. Clearly, the abuse is
basically that of union rather than employer practices; if the employee has
remedies against the union, present Board policy is too indirect. But no sure
remedy exists. Redress in any form26 depends upon the ability to convince a
union leadership a chance to perpetuate itself and to stifle any rank-and-file movement,
through the weapon of the discharge, sanctioned by the closed-shop proviso. The closed-
shop contract would become labor's Frankenstein. Only if the employees would always
retain the power to change their representatives would the ground be prepared for an
unceasing responsibility on the part of the leadership to the employees." RosrNPAuM,
THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND How IT WoRis 271 (1940). But see Witmer,
Civil Liberties and the Trade Union, 50 YM.. L. J. 621, 630-1 (1941): ". . . The im-
portance of freedom from coercion by the employer in the choice of a bargaining repre-
sentative at a labor board election can only with difficulty be thought of as implying a
duty on the union's part not to discipline its members if they choose to put another or-
ganization ahead of their own. The very existence of the union will often depend on its
being able to do so."
25. It can hardly be argued that the closed-shop will be altered as the status most
favored by unions or even that the position of the union in bargaining with the employer
will be much affected. Even if it be considered that the Board policy is taking from
unions a right they had before, unions would still retain adequate disciplinary power
over members for enforcing the collective agreement. See note 6 .supra. But unions never
had the right to expel for activity during the NLRB election campaign, if the Board
is correct in its interpretation of the public policy of the Act. Whenever a private agree-
ment such as a closed-shop contract and a public right clash, the private agreement must
give way. "Obviously employers cannot set at naught the National Labor Relations Act
by inducing their workmen to agree not to demand performance of the duties which it
imposes." National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U. S. 350, 364 (1940). The com-
panies involved in the principal cases cannot then contend that the expellees, even through
their unions, could have contracted away their rights under the Act to free the company
from the obligation not to discriminate against them for that reason. Compare Medo
Photo Supply v. NLRB, 321 U. S. 678, 687 (1944); NLRB v. Walt Disney Produc-
tions, 146 F.2d 44 (C. C. A. 9th 1945), cert. denied, 324 U. S. 877 (1945); NLRB v.
Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 874 (C. C. A. 1st 1941), cert. denied, 313 U. S. 595
(1945); NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 116 F.2d 306 (C. C. A. 7th 1940).
Local 2880 recognized that expulsion and discharge could not be justified under
every circumstance, by referring to the White Cross case as "foreign to the issue here"
because of the "complete immunity . . . under Section 8 (4) of the Act" to those testi-
fying at a Board hearing. Brief for Petitioners, p. 54, n.19, Local No. 2880, Lumber &
Sawmill Workers v. NLRB, 158 F.2d 365 (C. C. A. 9th 1946). No explanation was
offered of why § 8 (4), and § 8 (4) only, gave rights to individuals which a closed shop
contract could not invade. It seems more reasonable to read all the specific provisions of
the Act in the light of its general purposes. The Board's interpretation of the purposes
and public rights granted by the Act has been upheld in recognition of its experience and
skill. See note 41 infra.
26. Against the union, possible remedies include damages (which supposedly are
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court that the situation warrants exception to the general concept that courts
will not interfere with the internal affairs of fraternal organizations' And
decisions granting relief rest most commonly on a violation of due process in
the expulsion procedures,28 a doctrine unavailable to the employees in the
principal cases. 9 Admittedly, in cases involving the substantive rights of
expellees, reinstatement to membership and damages for loss of wvages have
been granted under circumstances similar to those of the White Cross add
Local 2880 cases.2 0 Also, there is some recent precedent for applying the due
more easily obtained than any other relief, see Witmer, supra note 24, at 63 n. 35) rein-
statement to membership, and enjoining execution of the labor agreement and inter-
ference with plaintiff's employment contract. See Notes, 56 YAmE L. J. 731, 733-4,
n.15--6, 18-21 (1947), 51 YALE L. J. 331 (1941), 49 YAmm L. J. 754 (1940), Closed Shops
and Closed Unions, 160 A. L. R. 918 (1946), Liability of Labor Union or Its Members
for Unlawful Suspension or Expulsion of Member, 62 A. L. R. 315 (1929), Actions
Against Labor Unions for Inducing Breach of Contract, 32 Irs.. L. Rv. 611 (1933).
There seems little chance for a successful direct suit against the employer. Since he
presumably acts in good faith under a valid contract, an independent cause of action is
not created; and a suit based on an "unfair labor practice" would fail because of "ex-
clusive" Board jurisdiction; §10(a).
27. See Summers, supra note 1, at 37-9; Bernhardt, The Right to a Job, 30 Co-u.
L. Q. 292, 307-13 (1945) ; Newman, The Closed Union, and the Right to Work, 43 COc.
L. REv. 42, 45-52 (1943) ; Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not For Profit,
43 Hanv. L. REv. 993 (1930); Comments, 51 YALE L. J. 1372 (1942), 45 yAL-n L. J.
1248 (1936); Note, 56 YALE L. J. 731, 734 n.17 (1947), and A. L. R. Notes cited note
26 supra. 'For the most part, in contests between union and member, the courts are sup-
porting the former's claim of authority to make general rules determinative of who shall
and who shall not be employed." Witmer, supra note 24, at 624.
At common law, unincorporated associations were not suable; few states retain this
view today. See, generally, Witmer, Trade Union Liability: The Problem of the Uin-
corporated Association, 51 YA= L. J. 40 (1941) ; Sturges, Unincorporated Associatior
as Parties to Actions, 33 YALE L. J. 383 (1924); Notes, Liability of Unincorporated
Labor Organization to Suit, 149 A. L. R. 503 (1944), 27 A. L. R. 786 (1923).
28. See Murdock, supra, note 3, at 85; A.mcAN Cvi. LmZraES Umo:, op. cit.
supra note 21, at 29-30, and (for cases) Supplement, 18-22; Witmer, Civil Liberties and
the Trade Union, 50 YAI L. J. 621, 630-4 (1941) ; Chamberlain, The Judicial Process in
Labor Unions, 10 BRoormy L. REv. 145, 160-5, 167-8 (1940); Steever, The Control of
Labor Through Union Discipline, 16 CoRN. L. Q. 212, 218-25 (1931).
29. There were apparently no procedural irregularities justifying court action. The
expellee in the Local 2880 case presented witnesses at his trial by the union and did not
take an appeal according to the union procedures. Brief for Petitioners, pp. 73-4, Local
No. 2880, Lumber & Sawmill Workers v. NLRB, 158 F2d 365 (C. C. A. 91h 1946).
In the White Cross case, the individual involved was suspended, rather than discharged,
pending her trial by the union; she apparently resorted directly to the Board. Brief for
Petitioner, pp. 5-6, Brief for Respondent, pp. 1-3, NLRB v. American White Cross
Laboratories, 160 F.2d 75 (C. C. A. 2d 1947). In the Aluminum Co. case, the expellee
did claim unfair union procedure, but this issue was apparently decided against him in
arbitration. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 4-5, Brief for Respondent, pp. 9-10, Aluminum
Company of America v. NLRB, 159 F.2d 523 (C. C. A. 7th 1946).
30. Ray v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 182 Wash. 39, 44 P2d 787 (1935) held
that an expulsion was unjustified for merely voting for a rival union at an election under
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process clause to certified bargaining agents for violations of substantive
rightsY- But some recent decisions have denied recovery,82 and relief in a
given case is uncertain. And even if legal success were likely the remedy
seems insufficient; the average worker does not have the funds necessary for
legal action, and the judicial award is too long delayed for his needs.P3
Present Board policy then, however circuitous, makes recovery more cer-
the Railway Labor Act. The majority implied that more active support might have
changed its decision, id. at 46, 48, 53, 44 P.2d at 790-3; the dissenting judge thought the
union justified in disciplining the member, id. at 54, 44 P.2d at 793. Abdon v. Wallace, 95
Ind. App. 604, 165 N.E. 68 (1929) allowed recovery for an expulsion based on testimony
under subpoena at an ICC hearing. Compare Spayd v. Ringling Rock Lodge, 270 Pa,
67, 113 AUt. 70 (1921) (signing petition to state legislature in opposition to union stand) ;
St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Thompson, 102 Tex. 89, 113 S. W. 144 (1908) (testimony in
court) ; Schneider v. Local 60, United Ass'n Journeymen Plumbers, 116 La. 270, 40 So.
700 (1906) (voting contrary to union's instruction in capacity of city plumbing inspec-
tor); Morgan v. Local 1150, United Electrical Workers, 16 LAB. RE,. Ra,. 720 (Ill.
Sup. Ct. 1945) (expulsion for political views in 1944 Presidential campaign). But see,
e.g., Elfer v. Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n, 179 La. 383, 154 So. 32 (1934) (circulating
anti-administration leaflet in union election campaign valid grounds for expulsion), and
cases cited note 32 infra.
31. Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946), 56 YALE L. J. 731 (1947);
cf. Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U. S. 192, 202, and Mr. Justice Murphy concur-
ring at 208-9 (1944) ; James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal:2d 721, 731, 155 P.2d 329, 335
(1944). See Summers, supra note 1, at 56-8.
32. Relief was denied on the ground that the union was justified in the substantive
basis of its action in suspension or expulsion of members in: Ames v. Dubinsky, 20
LAB. REL. REP. (Labor-Management) 2021 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947) (union may decide
factual question of fair comment in internal affairs); De Mille v. Am. Fed. of Radio
Artists, 15 LAB. REL. REP. 910 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1945) (non-payment of special legislative
assessment) ; Shein v. Rose, 12 N.Y.S.2d 87 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (political affiliation).
Adherence to acceptable procedures by the union was the basis in denying members
redress in: Glauber v. Patoff, 294 N. Y. 583, 63 N. E.2d 181 (1945) (must prove bad
faith on the part of membership as a whole to recover damages); accord, Browne v.
Hibbets, 290 N. Y. 459, 49 N. E.2d 713 (1943); Janow v. Grad, 16 N. Y. S.2d 118
(Sup. Ct. 1939) (violation of local's procedures irrelevant if procedures of parent union
have been observed) ; Strobel v. Irving, 171 Misc. 965, 14 N.Y.S.2d 864 (N.Y. City Cts.
1939) (if member pleads guilty at union trial, court will not review union's action, even
if in fact member committed no offense).
The freedom of unions to exclude whomever they wish from membership for eco-
nomic motives was upheld in: Walter v. McCarvel, 309 Mass. 260, 34 N. E.2d 677
(1941); Boro Park Sanitary Mkt. v. Heller, 280 N. Y. 481, 487, 21 N. E.2d 687, 688-9
(1939); Acierno v. North Shore Bus Co., 173 Misc. 79, 17 N. Y. S2d 170 (Sup. Ct.
1939) ; Murphy v. Higgins, 12 N. Y. S.2d 913 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 260 App. Div. 854,
23 N. Y. S.2d 552 (1st Dep't 1940); cf. Kanzler v. Linoleum, Carpet & Soft Tile Work-
ers, 20 Wash.2d 718, 149 P.2d 276 (1944).
33. See Summers, mtpra note 1 at 62-3, for one example. Others are Polin v. Kaplan,
257 N. Y. 277, 177 N. E. 833 (1931) (recovery for loss of wages allowed, but not re-
covery of attorney's fee) ; and Browne v. Hibbets, swpra note 32 (reinstatement to mem-
bership ordered, but no damages for loss of employment).
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tain and does not drain finances of the individual worker ;34 but its deficiencies
and ramifications should not be overlooked. The employer may frequently be
placed in a dilemma when, an employee, about to be discharged at union re-
quest, alleges the expulsion to be for support of a rival union during the "ap-
propriate time." There is no assurance that advice from the Board is readily
available, whether the employer discharges or refuses to do so, he faces the
possibility that the Board may subsequently decide differently from him the
reason for the exclusion or expulsion, and thereby find him guilty of an unfair
practice in discriminating against either the rival or the incumbent union."0
Moreover, if he fails to discharge he runs the risk of a strike3 7 Unions too
derive no pleasure from the policy. Their fear centers in the possible spread
of Board surveillance over internal union affairs 3s unions can well view with
34. The Board rather than the individual is the protagonist in the complaint and
may obtain court enforcement of its order, § 10 (b) (e) of the Act.
35. There must be a formal hearing before a binding order can issue, [§ 10 (b)]
-which the Board itself may review, [§ 10 (c)]. The relevance of appropriations cur-
rently being cut in Congress to the ability of the Board to get investigators on the spot
immediately is obvious.
While there can be no binding determination, there may be sv.ift notice to the em-
ployer from the Board that the discharge may be deemed an unfair practice. The Wallace
Corporation, for example, was so informed "immediately after" it made the discharges.
Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U. S. 248, 257 (1944).
36. If he investigates the causes of the discharge, he may be accused of interfernce
by the incumbent union, and face a charge of violating §§ 8(1) (2). If he does not dis-
charge the individual, this may be taken by the Board as an indication of employer
preference for the rival union, which might be a similar violation. If he does not in-
vestigate and does discharge, the instant Board policy may be applied, and a violation of
§ 8 (3) found in discrimination against the rival union.
37. The Act guarantees the right to strike, § 13, and there has been no question of
that right where the employer is committing an unfair practice, as he would be if the
Board were finally to agree with the incumbent union's position. On the other hand, if
there is no unfair practice, the Board has recently strengthened a previously indicated
policy of not ordering reinstatement of the strikers. Thompson Products, Inc., 72
N. L. R. B. No. 150 (Feb. 21, 1947) ; American News Co., 55 N. L. R. B. 1302 (1944).
but cf. Columbia Pictures Corp., 64 N. L.R.B. 490 (1945). Despite NLRB v. Indiana
Desk Co., 149 F.2d 987 (C. C. A. 7th 1945) denying right to strike in effect against
-wartime wage controls, it is questionable whether the Court would today uphold this
Board limitation on the right to strike. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U. S. 31 (1942),
-which disallowed reinstatement for strikers who were found to be violating a mutiny
statute, was a 5-4 decision; the three Justices who have since left the Court were all
-with the majority; cf. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240 (1939);
NLRB v. Sands Alfg. Co., 306 U. S. 332 (1939); in both of which the only Justices still
mnembers of the Court, Black and Reed, were in dissent. See Note, 59 HAv. L Rzv. 747
(1946).
38. It must be emphasized that the Act is not directed against union practices. The
only definition of illegal acts is contained in § 8, "It shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer. . . " (emphasis added). On the other hand, the Board's investigatory
powers, § 11, are granted without qualification, and clearly extend to union affairs, for
there could otherwise be no decisions relating to company domination or proper bargain-
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trepidation extensions of jurisdiction by a Labor Boa creating from its
own statutory interpretation a power unchecked by specific legislative limita-
tion. Finally, the limited scope of the policy provides no complete protection
to individual workers, since a discharge is obviously a prerequisite to the
inception of Board action. a9
These defects are basic to the policy and their correction can come only
through Congressional action aimed at the union, rather than the employer.
Such action, however, should not abrogate Board jurisdiction; it would be
unwise for Congress to rely on the courts to administer, for example, a stat-
ute listing union practices which are against public policy. Union evasive
practices" and unwarranted charges of statutory violations would tax the
judiciary with what is essentially a subtle fact-finding problem. The task is
administrative4 ' and a Labor Board already exists. If the legislation were to
grant the Board jurisdiction over specified union practices with power to
issue reinstatement orders to both union and employer,42 employers would be
relieved of the responsibility of caring for a public interest, and unions, were
the statute sufficiently specific, would be forewarned. And if, as under pres-
ing unit. Furthermore, the Board has threatened to revoke certifications for racial dis-
crimination, Larus & Bros. Co., 62 N. L. R. B. 1075 (1945) and cases there cited, or
for discrimination because of prior union activity, R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 61
N. L. R. B. 112, 116 (1945). It has even been suggested that closed-shop unions qualify
as "employers" under the Act, so that Board orders may be addressed directly to them,
since they have "the right to control effectively the tenure of employment." See Board
Member Reynolds dissenting in Lewis Meier & Co., 72 N. L. R. B. No. 106 (April 24,
1947).
39. See Ames v. Dubinsky, 20 LA. Rim. RF'. (Labor-Management) 2021 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1947), where the members were granted work cards, defeating the jurisdiction
of the Board, but were suspended from union membership, effacing their participation in
union decision-making; the offense was circulation of statements "detrimental to the
interests" of the union and its officers during the organization's election campaign. See
Witmer, supra note 28.
40. The union may either make it as difficult as possible for the Board to unearth its
true motive, for example by assigning many other reasons for its action; or it may not
expel the offensive member, but may impose fines or tasks not quite onerous enough to
justify his deciding to go through the ordeal of defiance, expulsion, discharge, and Board
procedures to reinstatement.
41. The opinion of Congress as to the proper forum for labor fact-finding-admin-
istrative agency or courts-was made clear in the Wagner Act by the establishment of a
new independent agency, §3. The Court has indicated it shares this opinion. See, e.g,
Switchmen's Union v. Nat'l Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297 (1943) (decision of Board
on proper unit is not reviewable) ; NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111, 130-1
(1944) [because of "experience" of Board, and its "familiarity" with labor problems its
determinations are "to be accepted .. if .. . (they have) 'warrant in the record' and
a reasonable basis in law."]
42. Refusal or revocation of certification as a weapon seems unjustifiable. In some
cases it would have little effect since the union's majority is so clear certification is no
boon; in others it would punish far beyond the need, and deprive workers of any union
representation.
NOTES
ent policy, Board jurisdiction were immediately invokable after expulsion, the
delay and possible expense of intra-union appeal would be avoided. Finally,
the instant issue, now necessarily treated as distinct, would fall into its
rightful place as but one of many in the generai problem of union democracy.
SEGREGATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS-A VIOLATION OF
"EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS" :
THE: doctrine that "separate but equal facilities" is not a violation of the
"equal protection of the laws" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
clearly enunciated in 1896 in Plessy v. Ferguson.2 The Supreme Court, pro-
ceeding on the assumption that compulsory segregation did "not necessarily
imply the inferiority of either race to the other,"3 held a law requiring separa-
tion on public carriers constitutional. 4
The rationale of that decision has been subsequently used by state courts to
justify segregation in the public schools,5 and the Supreme Court, without
squarely meeting the question of constitutionality, has implied its approval.
It has held that school boards will not be restrained from using public funds
-for the establishment of white high schools while none exist for colored chil-
dren;7 that a Chinese child is not deprived of the equal protection of the laws
if registered in a colored school;8 that colleges incorporated under state laws
may be penalized as corporations for not abiding by state segregation stat-
utes ;9 and that a State University must admit colored students for the study
*Westminster v. Mendez (C. C. A. 9th April 14, 1947), affirming Mendez v. West-
mninster School Dist., 64 F. Supp. 544 (S. D. Cal. 1946).
1. U.S. CoNsT. AaMND. XIV, § 1. For a detailed history of the Amendment see,
FLAcE THE ADoIoN OF THE FouRm-Ean AM DMENT (1908).
2. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
3. Id. at 544. "We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to con-
sist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the tvo races stamps the colored
xace with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the
act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it." Id. at
.551.
4. See vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Harlan, id. at 552.
5. See notes 41-3 infra.
6. Waite, The Negro in the Supreme Court, 30 Mrx. L. REv. 219 (1946).
7. Cummings v. Board of Ed., 175 U.S. 528 (1899). "It was said at the argument
-that the vice in the common school system of Georgia was the requirement that the white
.and colored children of the State be educated in separate schools. But we rced not consider
that question in this case!" Id. at 543. (Italics added.)
8. Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927). Taft, C. J., refused to discuss the con-
stitutionality of educational segregation considering the matter closed by decisions in the
Cummings and Plessy cases.
9. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908). "The statute is dearly separable
and may be valid as to one class while invalid as to another. Even if it were concecded thIat
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of law where no other provision has been made for the legal education of Ne-
groes.
10
However, a recent District Court decision, n affirmed by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, has questioned the basic assumption of the Plessy case and
may portend a complete reversal of the doctrine.12 In affirming an injunction
against the arbitrary assignment of children of Mexican ancestry to separate
schools, the Circuit Court chose to avoid the constitutional issue and relied
solely on the violation of a California statute which restricted segregation, 3
whereas the lower court had based its decision on both the statute and the
"cequal protection" clause.14 Although the facilities of the Mexican schools
were admittedly equal to those of other district schools, the District Court
felt that it was not enough to provide the same text books and' courses of in-
struction that were available to other public school children. "A paramount
requisite in the American system of public education is social equality. It
must be open to all children by unified school association regardless of line-
age."315
Modern sociological and psychological studies lend much support to the
District Court's views. A dual school system, even if "equal facilities" were
ever in fact provided, does imply social inferiority.16 There is no question
its assertion of power over indiiduals cannot be sustained, still it must be upheld so far
as it restrains corporations." Id. at 54. (Italics added.) See 82 U. oF PA. L. REV.
157 (1933).
10. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). The issue of segregation
was not before the Court and was not discussed. For final outcome see Missouri e.v rel.
Gaines v. Canada, 344 Mo. 1238i 131 S.W.2d 217 (1939).
11. Mendez v. Westminster School Dist., 64 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1946), 30 MINX.
L. REv. 646, 47 CoL L. REv. 325 (1947).
12. Westminster v. Mendez (C.C.A. 9th April 14, 1947). No petition for certiorari had
been filed by the school district as this went to press, although a petition is planned. Com-
munication to YALE LAw JOURNAL from Joel E. Ogle, county counsel Santa Ana County.
Whether certioriari is granted or not, there are cases presently pending in Oklahoma,
Texas, Louisiana and South Carolina which involve state educational segregation statutes
which may require a Supreme Court ruling in the near future on the constitutional issue
of the Mendez case. Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL from Robert L. Carter, As't
Special Counsel National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
13. CAL. ED. CODE §§ 16004-5 (Deering, 1944). Since the decision in this case a law out-
lawing educational segregation of children of Indian, Chinese and Japanese extraction has
been enacted in California. The Pittsburgh Courier, June 28, 1947, p. 12, col. 2.
14. The District Court rejected the contention that such schools were necessary to
cope with the language handicap of Spanish-speaking children. It emphasized that the
language tests given were superficial and unreliable and that in some instances the sole
criterion for separate classification was the Mexican name of the child. Mendez v. West-
minster School Dist., 64 F. Supp. 544, 550 (S.D. Cal. 1946). "Actually, many other fac-
tors having slight connection with a command of English enter in. Apparent prosperity,
cleanliness, the aggressiveness of parents, and the quota of Mexican-Americans already in
the mixed school are factors." Tucx, Nor WITH THE FisT 185-6 (1946).
15. Mendez v. Westminster Sthool Dist., 64 F. Supp. 544, 549 (S.D. Cal. 1946).
16. BOND, EDUCATION OF THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAN SOCIAL ORDER 385 (1934);
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under such circumstances as to which school has the greater social prestige.
Every authority on psychology and sociology is agreed that the students sub-
jected to discrimination and segregation are profoundly affected by this ex-
perience. though it has been argued that to force the abolition of educational
segregation would create problems of adjustment more injurious to the per-
sonalities of children than are presently engendered in separate schools, 1T the
prevailing view indicates the advisability of unified school associations.18 Ex-
perience with segregation of Negroes has shown that adjustments may take
the form of acceptance, avoidance, direct hostility and aggression, and in-
direct or deflected hostility.1 In seeking self-expression and finding it
blocked bl the practices of a society accepting segregation, the child may
express hatred or rage 0 which in turn may result in a distortion of normal
MoroN, WHAT THE NEGRo THrNxs 99 (1929); Bunche, Education in Blach and 1W.hite,
5 3. OF NEGRO ED. 351 (1936). See also, GALL.AGEm, AmuCA= CASM A:.D THE NEGco
COLLEGE 184 (1938) ; MEDAL, AN AmmcAx DnIMuA 54-5, 97-101, 577-S, 1315-7 n. 32
(1944) ; Kilpatrick, Resort to Courts by Negroes to Iinpro-rc Their Schools a Conditional
Altecnatve, 4 J. OF NEGRo ED. 412, 415 (1935). See generally, DAvis AND DoUArJ, CatL-
DREN OF BONDAGE (1940) ; DOLLkaw, CAsTE AND CLASS IN A Sournln Tow: (1937) ;
WooFrE, THE BASIS OF RACIAL ADyusr, E r (1925). The failure of a statute expressly
to declare a legal inferiority does not prevent the courts' scrutiny of the apparent classifi-
cation to determine the real intent of the law. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 244
(1911) ; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 240 (1904) ; Stone, The Common Law in
tw United States, 50 HAuv. L. REv. 4, 24 (1936).
17. PRossm, NoN-AcADEmiC DEVELOPM N OF NEGRO CHILDREN ni fIXED AND
SEGREGATED ScHooLs (1933) (Unpublished Doctor's Dissertation cited in Thompson,
Court Action the Only Reasonable Alternative to Remedy Imnmnediate Abusses of the Negro
Separate School, 4 J. oF NEGRO ED. 419, at 430 [1935]). Criticized, id. at 430 ct seq.
".. . the result of the experiment (mixed schools) may be complete ruin of character, gift,
and ability and ingrained hatred of schools and men.... We shall get a finer, better bal-
ance of spirit; an infinitely more capable and rounded personality by putting children in
schools where they are wanted, and where they are happy and inspired, than in thrusting
them into hells where they are ridiculed and hated." Du Bois, Does th Negro Arced
Separate Schools?, 4 J. oF NE=o ED. 328, 331 (1935). This assertion is qualified id. at
335. "Other things being equal, the mixed school is the broader, more natural basis for
the education of all youth. It gives wider contacts; it inspires greater self-confidence;
and suppresses the inferiority complex. But other things seldom are equal, and in that
case, Sympathy, Knowledge, and the Truth, outweigh all that the mixed school can offer."
18. BoND, op. cit. supra note 16, at 13. "However, all social psychology teaches that
early contact with members of diverse racial groups is more conducive toward interracial
amiability than total separation up to adulthood." Id. at 385.
Referring specifically to the educational practices condemned in the instant case, Miss
Tuck asserts as one of the effects of segregation "... . the one-sided development, the
ignorance of life outside one's own group, which results from segregation." Tuck, op. cit.
supra note 14, at 187. See also, FOREMAN, Evlo~xmirA. FAcrons nz Nno ELEr: -
TARY EDUCATION (1932) ; GALLAGHER, op. cit. supra note 16, at 321-2; Kx.nnuzn, Rcz
DnIFEREicEs 345-7 (1935); MoroN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 99; Youxa, Az =. cAm
MINORITY PEOPLES 495 (1932).
19. JOHNsON, PAZmRNs OF NEGRO SEGREGATOr 244-324 (1943).
20. See HEINRicH, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF A SUPPRESSED PEOPLE 52 (1937); DoL.Ann.
op. cit. supra note 16, at 269, 441; YouxG, op. cit. supra note 18, at 585.
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social behavior by the creation of the defense mechanism of secrecy.2 The
effects of a dual school system force a sense of limitations upon the child2
and destroy incentives,m produce a sense of inferiority,24 give rise to mecha-
nisms of escape in fantasy2 5 and discourage racial self-appreciation.20  These
abnormal results, condoned by the implications of the Plassy case, deny to the
Negro and Mexican child "equal protection of the laws" in every meaningful
sense of the words.
Experience in states in which segregation is compulsory and of long stand-
ing,27 moreover, indicates that "equality" of facilities does not, in fact, coexist
with segregation. In 193940 the average expense in nine Southern states
for a white pupil was almost 212% greater than the average expense per Ne-
gro pupil, and, in Mississippi 606.6% greater.28 Seventeen states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia showed for the year 1941-2 a ratio of 36.1 Negro pupils to one
21. HEINRICH, op. cit. supra note 20, at 20; MoroN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 12-3.
Other methods used by Negroes in the process of accommodation to the fact of segrega-
tion are aggression against whites or other Negroes, giving up the competition for white
caste values and accepting other forms of gratification, or competing for the values of
/white society thereby raising their own class position. They may manage aggression
partly by expressing dominance within their own group and partly by suppression of the
impulse as individuals. DoLLARD, op. cit. supra note 16, at 253.
22. The child is reminded of his position in all situations whether at home, in school,
at the theater, or in the street. He soon discovers that he is not allowed to compete on
equal terms with others. Long, Some Psychogenic Hazards of Segregated Education of
Negroes, 4 J. OF NEGRO ED. 336, 343 (1935).
23. Recognizing at an early age that he must live with limited choice and opportunity
regardless of ability, the ambition of the child is diverted into compensatory channels.
Mediocrity is accepted as the standard as a result of the absence of adequate social stimu-
lus. Ibid. See also, Long, The Intelligence of Colored Elementary Pupils in Washington,
D. C. in 3 J. OF NEGRO ED. 205-22 (1934) (lack of incentive results in depressed intelli-
gent quotients) ; GAIAGHm, op. cit. supra note 16, at 107 (the apparent laziness or shift-
lessness of the Negro is in reality the defeatism and resignation beaten into him by so-
ciety during the formative years of his growth).
24. See Long, op. cit. supra note 22, at 343 et seq.; HmxbcH, op. cit. supra note 20,
at 57-61; MYRDAi, op. cit. supra note 16, at 758.
25. In a mild form this is quite normal. However, bafflement may lead the individual
to take flight in unreality in order to escape a world of adversity. For a discussion of the
various manifestations of this escape mechanism see Long, op. cit. supra note 22, at 345
et seq. and authorities cited therein. See also, GAL.AGHER, op. cit. supra note 16, at 109;
SuTHEmAND, COLOR, CLASS, Aw PExsoxAxrry 42-59 (1942).
26. POWDERMAXER, ArTR FREEzom 325-7 (1939); Long, op. cit. supra note 22, at
349. Contra: JOHNSON, op. cit. supra note 19, at 320; PARK AND BURGESS, INTRODUCTION
"TO THE SCIENCE OF SOCIOLOGY 628-9 (1924).
27. Ala., Ark., Del., D.C., Fla., Ga., Ky., La., Md., Miss., Mo., N.C., Okla., S.C.,
Tenn., Texas, Va., and W. Va. Twelve of these states have constitutional provisions as
-%vell as statutes requiring segregation. For typical constitutional and statutory provisions
see ALA. CoxsT. ART. XIV, § 256, ALA. CODE, tit. 52, § 93, (1940).
28. Blose and Caliver, Statistics of the Education of Negroes: A Decade of Progrest
6, Table 8 (1944), cited in Brief for N.A.A.C.P. as Amicus Curiae, p. 12, Westminster
v. M~endez (C.C.A. 9th, April 14, 1947).
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teacher while the ratio for whites was 28.6 to one.2 The average length of
the school term in 1943-4 in these states was 173.5 days for whites, but only
164.0 days for Negroes. ° The average annual salary for a white teacher in
fifteen Southern states and the District of Columbia was $1,349 while the
average Negro teacher's salary was $895. There is a scarcity of properly
trained Negro teachers 32 and a lack of teaching equipment in the colored
schools.P One reason for the failure to provide "equal facilities" for a segre-
gated school system is the difficulty of securing adequate funds for its main-
tenance. The necessity for increasing the tax burden to maintain dual school
and transportation facilities of equal caliber would impoverish many finan-
cially insecure communities3 4
The effects upon society of segregation and of the correlative inequality of
facilities have become increasingly clear. In the critical period of June-July
1943, when the need for manpower was urgent, 34.57 of the Negroes and
only 8% of the whites rejected for military service failed to meet the mini-
mum educational standards.35 In the professions, where the needs for Negro
29. Blose and Alves, Statistics of State School Systems, .2939-40 and 1941-42, U.S.
OFFIcE OF ED., Bz xiA.L SuRvEY oF EDUCATION un =n UmiTnm STATES 37, Table XXI
(1944). The pupil teacher ratio in 1944 for the thirty-one States not requiring separate
schools for Negroes was 27.5. Blose and Foster, Statistics of State School Systems,
1943-44, U.S. OmrcE oF ED., BmNIAL Suvrr or EDucATo 0 in Tim Umumn STA -s
1942-1944, 13 (1946).
30. Blose and Foster, id. at 71, Table 34. Mississippi had the shortest school term for
both whites and Negroes, 165.5 days for whites and 130.0 days for Negroes. Ibid. In Illi-
nois the length of the school term was 186.8 days. Id. at 45, Table 19. The average num-
ber of days attended by each white pupil enrolled in the southern states was 145.0 and by
each Negro, 133.4 days. The percentage of white pupils in daily attendance was 83.6%
compared with 81.4% for Negroes. Id. at 71, Table 34.
31. Ibid. (Only fifteen States reported annual salaries). The figures for Mississippi
show the annual salary for whites to have been $1,107 and only $342 for Negroes.
32. BoxD, op. cit. supra note 16, at 267-70, 277-83. See also ScmuE:E, AEr.-i Am=R-
cAxrs 160-1 (1936) (low standards prevail in many colored schools).
33. Kovrr'z, TnE ALmE AND THE ASIATIC rx Aum ICAN, LAW 229 (1946); MA-.
GUih, THE L)EGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRo (1940), 129-O; MorToN, op. cit. Mspra note 16,
at 101; MYRDAi., op. cit. supra note 16, at 902-7; ScHElx=, op. cit. supra note 32, at 161,
166-9; Hubbard and Alexander, Types of Potentially Favorable Court Cases Relative to
the Separate School, 4 J. oF NEGRO ED. 375, 377 (1935) ; Harris and Spero, Negro Prob-
lent in 11 ENcYc. Soc. Sc. 335, 352 (1933); Home, "Dog Houe" Education, 5 J. or
NEGRO ED. 359 et seq. (1936) ; Comment, 13 So. CM.n. L. RMv 68 (1939).
34. Bonn, op. cit. supra note 16, at 231; JoHNsoN, op. cit. Mspra note 19, at 17, 321;
MANGto i op. cit. supra note 33, at 132; MYRDAr, op. cit. supra note 16, at 337-44; Sri-xFs,
NlGson-s AND THE LAw 91 (1937) ; "Far from being an extra burden, the dual system
... as it operates today is an actual means of saving rather large sums of money because
only the first half of the 'separate but equal' clause tends to be enforced." GA .LAGm, op.
cit. supra note 16, at 119. See also Wirth, The Price of Prejudice, Survey Graphic, Jan.,
1947, pp. 19-21.
35. MONTOERY, ALA., Am. TEACHE.S Ass'N, THE BLAcK Aun WnrE or RE-
JECToNs F R 1MLIARY SERVIE 5 (1944), cited in Brief for N.A.A.C.P. supra note 28,
at 17.
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personnel continue unsatisfied, the 1940 ratio of white physicians to white
citizens was one to 735 while the ratio for Negroes was one to 3651.30 One
lawyer served 670 whites but there was only one lawyer for 12,230 Negroes.T
One dentist served 1,752 whites whereas there was only one dentist for 8,800
Negroes.38 In the seventeen states officially practicing segregation, profes-
sional education for Negroes is virtually non-existent.30 It is impossible to
state the precise effect of educational segregation on the lack of qualified
professional personnel since the educational system is, in a sense, a reflection
of the caste society in which it functions. Its role, however, in perpetuating
the existing social inequality makes it a causative factor of great importance.40
State courts have been slow to apply these facts to problems of segrega-
36. In 1940, there were 160,845 white and 3,524 Negro physicians and surgeons in the
United States. In proportion to population these represented one physician to the follow-
ing number of the white and Negro population, respectively:
Section White Negro
U.S . ............. 735 3,651
North ............ 695 1,800*
South ............ 859 5,300*
West ............ 717 2,000*
Miss ............ 4,294 20,000*
* To the nearest hundred or thousand.
Thompson, Some Critical Aspects of the Problem of the Higher and Professional Edusca-
tion for Negroes in 14 J. OF NEGRO ED. 509, 511-2 (1945).
37. Section White Negro
U.S .............. 670 12,230
North ............ 649 4,000*
South ............. 711 30,000*
West ............. 699 4,000*
Miss ............ 4,234 358,000*
* To the nearest hundred or thousand.
Thompson, id. at 512.
38. Section White Negro
U.S ............... 1,752 8,800*
North ............. 1,555 3,900*
South ............. 2,790 14,000*
West ............. 1,475 3,900*
Miss ............. 14,190 37,000*
* To the nearest hundred or thousand.
Thompson, id. at 512.
39. Id. at 514-5.
40. "(the school) has been the product and interpreter of the existing system, sus-
taining and being sustained by the social complex." BOND, op. cit. supra note 16, at 13;
GALLAGHER, op. cit. supra note 16, at 185; Bunche, op. cit. spra note 16, at 351. For a
discussion of this point see the excellent work of the late Prof. Alexander Pekelis in the
Brief for Am. Jewish Cong. as Amicus Curiae, p. 14, Westminster v. Mendez (C.C.A. 9th
April 14, 1947); Heningburg, What Shall We Challenge in the Existing Orderf in 5
J. OF NEGRO ED. 383, 386-7 (1936).
[Vol, 56,1061
NOTES
tion. They have, in the main, adhered to the "separate but equal facilities"
doctrine in accepting the constitutionality of segregationi although they have
tended to insist upon a stricter enforcement of "equal facilities."'4 3 Some
courts have invalidated such practices, but only on the basis of their own stat-
utes.:4
Contrastingly, the Supreme Court has generally considered racial classifica-
tions and distinctions on a governmental level, contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment.4 5 Only with regard to common carriers4 0 and to wartime meas-
ures adopted against persons of Japanese e-traction, 4 7 has the Court directly
upheld such classification. Residential segregation set up by state legislation
41. See State ex rel. Weaver v. Ohio State Universit,, 126 Ohio St. 290, 185 N.E.
196 (1933) (colored girl not admitted to residence with white girls in Home Economics
Course); Dameron v. Bayless, 14 Ariz. 180, 126 Pac. 273 (1912) (distance to a Negro
school is not a factor in determining "equality"); Reynolds v. Board of Ed., 66 Kan. 672,
72 Pac. 274 (1903) (larger building for white students did not make for unequal facili-
ties).
42. Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. 193 (Mass. 1849) (it is not unreasonable to require
Negro pupils to walk 1/5 of a mile further to a Negro school than white pupils have to
walk); Wright v. Board of Ed., 129 Kan. 852, 284 Pac. 363 (1930) (forcing a Negro
child to walk twenty blocks is not unreasonable) ; Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 17 Am. Rep.
405 (1874) ; Cory v. Cartier, 48 Ind. 327 (1874) ; Lehew Y. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 15
S.M. 765 (1890) ; People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 45 Am. Rep. 232 (1M) ;
State ex rel. Games v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198 (1871) ; State ex rtel. Michael v. Witham,
179 Tenn. 250, 165 S.W. 2d 378 (1942) ; Sweatt v. Painter, Ct. of Travis County, Texas,
No. 74,945 (1946), 4 NAT'L BJ. 365.
43. Piper v. Big Pine School Dist, 193 Cal. 664, 226 Pac. 926 (1924) ; Jones v. New-
Ion, 81 Colo. 25, 253 Pac. 386 (1927) ; Graham v. Board of Ed., 153 Kan. 840, 114 P. 2d
313 (1941) ; Patterson v. Board of Ed., 11 N.J. Misc. 179, 164 At. 792 (Sup. Ct. 1933)
aff'd 112 N.J.L. 99, 169 Atl. 690 (Ct. Err. & App., 1934). See also Jones v. Board of
Ed., 90 Okla. 233, 217 Pac. 400 (1923) (accommodations sufficient to allow some students
to attend school only part time are a violation of the state constitution) ; Pearson v. Mur-
ray, 169 Md. 478, 182 AtL. 590 (1936) ; Williams v. Board of Ed., 79 Kan. 202, 99 Pae.
216 (1908). See 45 Ymrx L. J. 1296 (1936), 20 MiN-N. L. IRv. 673 (1936). See
.Note, 103 A.L.R. 713 (1938).
44. Jones v. Newlon, 81 Colo. 25,253 Pac. 386 (1927); Clark v. Board of Directors, 24
Iowa 266 (1868) ; Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 Atl. 590 (1936) ; People cx rctl.
Workman v. Board of Ed., 18 Mich. 400 (1869) ; Jones v. Board of Ed., 90 Okla. 233, 217
Pac. 400 (1923) ; Kaine v. Commonwealth ex rel. Manaway, 101 Pa. St. 490 (1882).
45. Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942) ; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) ; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) ; Truax
v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) ; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881) ; Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) ; Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) ; Missouri cx rel.
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). The Court has also denied certiorari in Alston v.
Norfolk School Board, 112 F. 2d 992 (C.C.A. 4th 1940), cert. denicd 311 U.S. 693 (1940).
46. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The Court has weakened the position
of the Plessy case by holding a state statute, requiring separation of races on carriers in
interstate commerce, unconstitutional. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
47. Hirabayashi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81 (1943) ; Ex pare Endo, 323 U.S. 23 (1944);
Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-
A Disaster, 54 YALE L. J. 489 (1945) ; Comment, 56 YAmm L. J. 1017 (1947).
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or municipal ordinances has been invalidated48 and even restriction by private
agreement can no longer be considered invulnerable.49
The only barrier to a flat holding that segregation is a denial of "equal
protection of the laws" is, in the last analysis, the Plessy case. However, the
basic assumption of the Court in that case, that compulsory segregation does
not imply social inferiority, has become untenable in the light of our present
knowledge of psychology and sociology. 0 It becomes apparent then, that the
conclusion of the court followed from the inaccuracy of its assumptions.
Consequently, having clearly implied that if discrimination were based upon
social inferiority it would be constitutionally unacceptable,ell the rationale of
the Ple~sy case becomes authority for the doctrine that segregation per se is a
denial of the protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment.
There is little doubt that the Supreme Court will be presented with a case
48. Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927), 36 YALE L. J. 274 (1926) (note on State
Court decision) ; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) ; Richmond v. Deans, 37 F.
2d 712 (C.C.A. 4th 1930), aO'd 281 U.S. 704 (1930). Other courts have followed this
same point of view. In re Lee Sing, 43 Fed. 359 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1890) (San Francisco
ordinance requiring Chinese to move to a certain part of the city is void as a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment and a treaty with China); State v. Gurry, 121 Md. 534, 88
AtI. 228 (1913) (municipality has no authority to enact segregation ordinance prohibiting
owner of property from using it because of his color) ; Clinard v. Winston-Salem, 217
N.C. 119, 6 S.E. 2d 867 (1940) ; State v. Darnell, 166 N.C. 300, 81 S.E. 338 (1914).
49. The Supreme Court has permitted anti-Negro restrictive covenants on the theory
that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited action by the State not by individuals. Corn-
gan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926). This supported decisions rendered by several State
tribunals. See, e.g., Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596 (1919);
Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532 (1925). A contrary decision had been
rendered by a California federal court. Gandolgo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (C.C.S.D. Cal.
1892). See also Bruce, Racial Zoning by Private Contract in the Light of the Constill-
tions and the Ride Against Restraints on Alienation, 21 ILL. L. Ray. 704 (1927); 4
Mum. L. REv. 68 (1919).
But the Court has recently shown a disposition to regard as state action activities
formerly considered "private". Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). The use of the
injunction to enforce such "private agreements" brings the state courts into the transac-
tion and this may be sufficient to bring this action within the prohibitions of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Kahen, Validity 'of Anti-Negro Restrictive Covenants: A Reconsid-
eration of the Problem, 12 U. OF Cmr. L. REv. 198 (1944).
In addition to the argument of the Fourteenth Amendment another attempt is now
being made to invalidate racial restrictive covenants as against public policy reflected in
international agreements. In re Drummond Wren, 4 D.L.R. 674 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 1945). See
Note, Anti-Discrimination Legislation and International Declarations As Evidence of
Public Policy Against Racial Restrictive Covenants, 13 U. OF CU. L. RaV. 477 (1946).
The United States has signed the United Nations Charter and the Act of Chapultepec,
both of which indicate an obligation to promote freedom for all without distinction as to
race, language or religion.
50. See notes 19-26 supra.
51. ". . . every exercise of the police power must be reasonable and extend only to
such laws as are enacted in good faith for the promotion of the public good and not for
the annoyance or oppression of a particular class." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550
(1896).
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involving segregation in schools within the next year or two.52 It is to be
hoped that the Court will meet the issue head-on by overruling the Plessy case
and stating broadly and unequivocally that compulsory segregation of indi-
viduals for reasons of race, religion, class or ancestry is a denial of "the equal
protection of the laws." The fear that there will be friction involved in the
readjustment of existing social relationships, 3 though entitled to substantial
consideration, should not overweigh the evils of segregation. The conse-
quences of the present rule, and of the generally complaisant acquiescense of
the Supreme Court in the Negrophobia of the American south, have been to
produce intense and sustained friction which has not diminished with the
years.54 In the process of equalizing the status of all groups in our society
there is no indication that a decision in the field of education vill cure the
evils of minority discrimination. However, it would abolish one of the most
successful .elements in its perpetuation and would help provide during the
formative years of intellectual growth the common associational experiences
necessary to destroy prejudice. 5 With increased judicial vigilance against at-
tempted evasions of the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment, 0 discrimination
can be checked and, it is to be hoped, eventually obliterated.
52. Communication to YALE LAw JouRaAL from Robert L. Carter, Mspra note 12.
53. DoLE, THE ETiQuErrE 6F RAcE RELATixos n THE Sour 168 (1937); GiiLA-
GHEZZ, op. cit. smpra note 16 at 153; MANGUM, op. cit. supra note 16, at 136; MvaDA., op.
cit. zupra, note 16 at 1011-15; YOUNG, op. cit. mipra note 18, at 503; KI 'ArXc=, Op. cit.
supra note 16, at 413.
54. For a discussion of a more harmonious pattern of race relations in other parts of
the world see Fmamn, THE MASTERS AND THE SLAVES (1946) ; Surrir, BRazn, PEOpLz
AND IN sTrrmos (1946); MAcIvI , CIVILIZATION AND Group RuAZ o.o:s (1945);
GaREa, OUR LATIN AmmcAN NMGH3BORS (1941); SToNEQUIsT, THE MAGmInAL MAN
(1937).
55. LASHER, RAcE ATTITUDES IN CHU.DREN 48, 197 (1929); Ware, The Role of the
Sclwois in Education for Racial Understanding, 13 J. or NEsno ED. 421-31 (1944);
FpAzmp, NunRo YOUTH AT THE CROSSWAYS 290 (1940) ; Long, op. cit. mspra note 22, at
343; GALLAGHER, Op. cit. supra note 16, at 17-27; BoND, op. cit. supra note 16, at 385;
TUCK, op. cit. supra note 14, at 194.
56. In a series of cases involving the right of Negroes to participate in the Demo-
cratic primary elections in Texas between 1927 and 1944, the Supreme Court voided sev-
eral attempts of the Texas legislature to deny the vote to Negroes. Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536 (1927) (Texas statute providing that no Negro be permitted to vote in a
Democratic primary election declared unconstitutional) ; Nixon v. Condon, 226 U.S. 73
(1932) (a state statute authorizing the state executive committee of each party to pre-
scribe qualifications of party members made the state executive committee an agent of
the State; a resolution barring Negroes from the primary was declared a denial of the
"equal protection of the laws" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) ; Smith v. Allvright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944) (state convention of the Democratic party resolved that only whites
were to vote in the primary; since primaries are conducted under state statutory authority
the party is in effect a state agent and cannot bar Negroes from voting).
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FRIENDLY ALIEN'S RIGHT TO SUE FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY
SEIZED BY ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN*
UNDER the original provisions of the Trading With the Enemy Act, opera-
tive during World War I, the President could seize and confiscate the prop-
erty of an enemy or ally of an enemy'located within the United States.1 Sec-
tion 9 (a) of the Act authorized "non-enemy" owners to sue for the return of
any property which might have been erroneously seized.2 At the outbreak of
World War II, however, Congress amended Section 5 (b) of the Act to enable
the President to vest the property of all foreign nationals.3 Thus friendly
alien property4 as well as enemy property located in this country became liable
* Ubersee Finanz Korporation v. Markham, 158 F.2d 313 (App. D.C., 1946), cert.
granted sub norn. Clark v. Ubersee Finanz Korporation, 67 Sup. Ct. 772 (1947).
1. Section 7 (c) of the Act provided that "if the President shall so require any money
or other property owing or on behalf of or belonging to or held for, by, on account of, or
for the benefit of an enemy or ally of enemy . . . which the president after investigation
shall determine is so owing or so belongs or is so held, shall be conveyed, transferred,
assigned, delivered or paid over to the Alien Property Custodian." 40 STAT. 418 (1917),
50 U.S.C. WAR ApP. §7(c) (1940).
2. 41 STAT. 977, 50 U.S.C. WAR Ap. § 9(a) (1940) provides: "Any person not an
enemy or claiming any interest, right, or title in any money or other property . . . con-
veyed, transferred, assigned, delivered, or paid to the Alien Property Custodian or seized
by him . . . may institute a suit in equity . . . in the district court of the United States
. . . to establish the interest, title, or debt so claimed, and if so established the court shall
order the payment, conveyance, transfer, assignment or delivery to said claimant of the
money or other property so held by the Alien Property Custodian . . . or the interest
therein to which the court shall determine said claimant is entitled."
3. 55 STAT. 839 (1941), 50 U.S.C. WAR App. §616 (Supp. 1946). The amendment
provides: "During the time of war or in a period of national emergency any property or
interest of any foreign country or national thereof shall vest, when, as, and upon the
terms, directed by the President . . . and . . . such interest or property shall be held,
used, administered, liquidated, sold or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the
benefit of the United States. . ."
Section 5(b), prior to its amendment in 1941, had provided solely for regulation, not
seizure, of foreign assets. 40 STAT. 411, 50 U.S.C. WAR Anp. § 5(b) (1940). Under Exec.
Order No. 9193, 7 FED. REG. 5205 (1942), a foreign national is defined as anyone who is a
citizen or subject of, or resident or domiciled in, a foreign country; any corporation or
partnership doing business in a foreign country; or anyone who is acting on behalf of such
a foreign national, corporation or partnership, or who there is reasonable cause to believe
is a foreign national as so defined.
4. For the purpose of the present Note, the term alien friend will be used to refer to
any foreign national who is not an enemy national within the meaning of the 1917 Act
which defined enemy national as any individual, partnership or other entity of enemy na-
tionality wherever resident, or any individual partnership, or other entity resident or do-
ing business within enemy territory including that territory which is occupied by enemy
forces. Although an American citizen could be considered as embraced within the above
definition, citizens will not be considered within the term alien friend as it is used here.
Thus in most cases an alien friend will be a citizen either of a neutral country or of a
country allied with the United States.
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to seizure. Since Congress made no other changes in the Act in 1941, a seri-
ous question has arisen as to whether an alien friend whose property has been
vested under Section 5(b) can still sue for its return under Section 9(a) of
the original Act. The problem is whether the amended Section 5(b) permits
both seizure and retention of the property of foreign nationals, thus limiting
suits under Section 9 (a) to American citizens, or whether the change in Sec-
tion 5 (b) was intended merely to broaden the seizure power without changing
the Section 9 (a) remedy of "non-enemy" claimants.5
This issue was recently posed in Ubcrsce Finan Korporation v. Marl-
ham.6 Ubersee, a Swiss holding company7 whose shares in American corpora-
tions8 had been vested by the Alien Property Custodian pursuant to Section
5 (b), sued to recover this property under Section 9 (a). The District Court
dismissed the complaint but the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed by a two to one vote. The appellate court construed Sec-
tion 5(b) as authorizing retention and confiscation of only enemy property.
The language of the section as to vesting of all foreign owned property was
interpreted as a practical provision to facilitate the immediate seizure of all
alien property, subject in the case of neutral property to a later judicial deter-
mination of enemy taint. The court concluded that Section 9 (a) was still an
integral part of the Act, available to non-enemy owners, and that recovery of
all non-enemy property would be granted if such claimants could sustain the
burden of proof with regard to both the nominal and beneficial ownership.
The court specifically rejected the government's argument that Section 9 (a)
must be construed with the amended Section 5 (b) as permitting recovery only
where the initial seizure was unauthorized. The government contended that a
suit under the Tucker Act for just compensation 0 would meet the constitu-
5. For the latter view see McNulty, Constitutionality of Alien Properly Controls, 11
LAw. AND CONTEMP. PROB. 135 (1945). Facts emphasized are that § 5(b) contains an ac-
quittance provision similar to that contained in the old § 7(e), a penalty provision similar
to that in the old § 16, and finally that it contains its own authorization for the dele-
gation of power by the President. Id. at 146 n.53. But see Wechsler, Conslitritionality of
Alien Property Controls: A Comment on Rcmedes, 11 LAw & CoiNsE-kW. Pnoa. 149
(1945).
6. 158 F.2d 313 (App. D.C., 1946), cert. granted 67 Sup. Ct. 772 (1947).
7. The holding company is reported to have been created for Fritz von Opel, a for-
mer "wealthy automobile manufacturer.' Von Opel is now a citizen of the Principality of
Liechtenstein, having left Germany in 1929, and is at present resident in the United States.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1947, p. 37, col. 1.
8. The interests vested are said to include a chain of midvwest filling stations, the
Harvard Brexing Company of Lowell, Mass, and the Spur Distributing Company of
Nashville. Ibid.
9. The dismissal was without opinion. See Ubersee Finanz Korporation Y. Mark-
ham, 158 F.2d 313, 314 (App. D.C. 1946).
10. 36 STAT. 1136 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 250 (1940) permits the recovery in the Court
of Claims on any claim "founded upon the constitution of the United States or any law of
Congress . . . (or) upon any contract claim express or implied, with the Government of
the United States." This provision has been liberally construed by the courts, particularly
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tional objections to the retention of friendly alien property, but the court
indicated that such a remedy was precluded by Section 7(c) which expressly
provides that "the sole relief and remedy of any person having any claim to
any money or other property . . . transferred to the Alien Property Custo-
dian shall be that provided by the terms of the Act.""u
The Ubersee case conflicts with another recent decision, that of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Silesian-American Corporation v. Mark-
ham.12 In that case the court held that an alien friend could not sue for re-
covery of property under Section 9 (a), but stated that when the government
seizes the property of a non-enemy owner, an implied promise arises to pay
just compensation and an alien friend may bring suit under the Tucker Act
for the value of its seized property. The differing results in the two cases
involve questions of 'constitutionality and statutory interpretation and will be
reviewed together by the Supreme Court.
The view of Section 5(b) adopted in the Silesian-Anwrican case required
the court to disregard the express language of both Sections 9 (a) and 7(c)
despite the refusal of the Supreme Court to indulge in a similar statutory re-
construction of the same Act one year earlier. 3 Moreover, the court's
refusal to permit alien friends to sue for the recovery of their property under
Section 9 (a) would not appear to accord with the intent of Congress, which
has twice refused to pass legislation which would have specifically outlawed
such suits and relegated alien friends to suits for just compensation under the
Tucker Act.1 4
in cases of federal activity resulting in the taking of private property, to permit suits
against the government on the theory that the taking of property gives rise to an implied
contract to pay just compensation. Yearsley v. Ross, 309 U.S. 18 (1940).
11. 40 STAT. 418 (1917), 50 U.S.C. WAR App. § 7(c) (1940). See dissenting opinion in
the Ubersee case to the effect that a claim for compensation for the taking of property is
not a claim to property and hence is not barred by the terms of § 7(c). This view
is also espoused by Wechsler, Constitutionality of Alien Property Controls: A Contncnt
on the Problem of Remedies, 11 LAw & CoNrEmp. Paon. 149, 151 (1945). The majority
of the court pointed out that the view of § 5 (b) urged by the government and adopted in
part by the dissent as vesting had been rejected as untenable in previous eases raising the
same point with respect to the seizure provision of the 1917 Act. See Central Union Trust
Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921).
12. 156 F.2d 793 (C.C.A.2d 1946), cert. denied, 67 Sup. Ct. 87 (1946) ; cert. granted,
67 Sup. Ct. 769 (1947).
13. Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404 (1945) in which the court refused to read
out of § 9 (a) the right which it conferred on non-enemy claimants to sue on a debt
owed to them by enemy nationals whose property had been vested.
14. H.R. 4840, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1944) and H.R. 5089, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1946). H.R. 4840 provided that a claimant might institute a suit under § 9(a) to
establish that he is not a foreign country or national thereof as defined in § 5(b). Fail-
ure to establish these facts would have entitled him to sue in the Court of Claims for
just compensation. The bill died in committee. Hearings before Subcommittce No. 1 of
the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 4840, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1944). H.R. 5089
provided in §33 (a) that "a foreign country or national thereof may not institute, prose-
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Although the court in the Silesian-Anwrican case assumed without analysis
that the government's construction of the Act-which it adopted-was consti-
tutionally sound, doubts were expressed in the Ubersee decision as to whether
Congress had the power to provide for the retention 0 of friendly alien prop-
erty even when compensation is available. Two principal issues appear to be
involved: whether Congress has the power to authorize the retention of non-
enemy property; and if so, whether a construction of Section 5(b) authoriz-
ing such retention and permitting compensation can be sustained under the
Fifth Amendment.
Opinion differs as to the constitutional power on which Section 5(b) was
designed to rest. However, whether an exercise of the war power,10 of the
cute, or further maintain a suit pursuant to §9(a) hereof in respect to any property or
interest vested in or transferred to the Alien Property Custodian... or the net pro-
ceeds thereof .. ." and in § 33 (b) provided that "notwithstanding the provisions of § 7(c)
such persons shall have the right to bring suit in the Court of Claims for just compen-
sation if so entitled under the Fifth Amendment. This section was deleted by the House
Judiciary Committee. The bill, containing § 33, was reintroduced as H.L 690 and
passed by the House with amendments not material here. However, the same section
was deleted by the Senate Judiciary Committee. S. 2378, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1946).
The Senate Report accompanying the bill explained the deletion as designed to "elimi-
nate the proposal to cut off the right of a friendly foreign national to sue for and obtain
return of his property under §9(a), (thus preserving) in full these rights under § 9(a)
which friendly foreign nationals together with United States citizens, have ld for more
than twenty-five years under the Act." SL-. REP. No. 1839, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1946).
The Senate bill as amended by the committee was passed by both Houses vith a few
members e-x-pressing regret over the deletion of § 33, 92 Co.-. REc. 10628 (1946). This
action was apparently taken as a direct result of the objections to the inclusion of § 33(a)
presented by the State Department and by members of various private trade and legal
associations. See letter of Secretary Byrnes to Chairman Sumners of the House Judiciary
Committee in connection with the hearings on H.R. 5089. Hcarings Before Subconmit-
tee No. 1 of the Committee on the Judiciar-y on HR. 50S9, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1946)
and Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 1 on the Judiciary on S. 2378, 79th Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1946).
15. The court utilized the term "vesting" rather than retention. But both in the de-
cision and in the Act as interpreted by the majority, the term "vesting" is used in a
dual sense: (1) to refer to the power to seize and retain and (2) to refer to the power
merely to seize. Thus under § 5(b) as construed by the court, enemy property can be
"vested" in the first sense, whereas friendly alien property can only be "vested" in the
second sense. To avoid this confusion, the terms "retention" and "seizure" %vill be used
respectively throughout this Note.
16. Throughout the committee and floor debates preceding passage of § 5(b), the
power sought to be exercised here was referred to by members of Congress as resting
on the war powers. See note 33 infra. However, in the Sile1can-American case, see note
12 supra, Judge Learned Hand assumed without argument that the section cannot rest
on the war powers. It may well be that Judge Hand was partially influenced by the
facts that §5(b) applies to periods of national emergency as well as to time of war, and
that the Act, unlike closely analogous war-time requisition statutes, contains no indica-
tion of the intended use of the property to be vested. See, for example, Act of June is,
1917, authorizing the requisition of ships, 40 STAT. 182 (1917) and the Property Requi-
sitioning Act, 55 STAT. 741 (1941), 50 U.S.C. §721 (Supp. 1941).
A,
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power of eminent domain,17 or of any other power granted to the federal gov-
ernment,1 8 the constitutional right to seize and retain non-enemy property,
with or without compensation, has in the past been acknowledged only where
the necessity, 19 or public purpose2" of the taking is clear. That the "national
interest"' necessitated the permanent vesting of friendly alien property
within the United States is cast in doubt by the alternative means of wartime
control that were available to the government. An elaborate system for block-
ing foreign assets and regulating financial transactions affecting foreign prop-
erty located in the United States was established by the Treasury Depart-
ment.2 2 In addition, the Alien Property Custodian was empowered to exer-
cise control over the use and operation of foreign property by supervising
business enterprises and other classes of foreign property belonging to foreign
nationals or in which the latter had an interest.2 3 Finally, under the Property
Requisition Act of 1941, the government could take over any property directly
needed for the war effort.
24
17. Suggestions have been made that §5(b) might be construed as an exercise of the
power of eminent domain. For refutation of this thesis, see Dulles, The Vesting Powers
of the Alien Property Cistodian, 28 CoRN. L. Q. 245, 257 (1943). The showing of
"public purpose" insisted on by the courts prior to the taking of the property under this
power, see note 19 infra, would seem to present the same problems raised by the ne-
cessity requirement for property seizures under the war powers, see note 18 infra.
18. In the Silesian-American case supra note 11, Judge Learned Hand concluded
that § 5(b) was an exercise of power under the common defense and general welfare
clause. U.S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. But the clause has always in the past been con-
strued as a measure of the tax power and not as an affirmative power on which to rest
general federal legislation. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1937).
19. For the courts' view of the requirement of necessity, see cases sustaining the con-
stitutionality of statutes enacted under the war powers during World War I in DoDD,
CasES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 517 (1941). For a discussion of the extent of the war
powers, see Littauer, Confiscation of the Property of Technical Enemies 52 YALE L. 3.
739 (1943).
20. For cases involving federal exercise of eminent domain, see Gettysburg Electric
Ry. v. United States, 160 U.S. 668 (1896) and United States v. Certain Lands in City of
Louisville, Jefferson County, Ky., 78 F.2d 689 (C.C.A. 6th 1935).
21. The phrase "national interest" as indicative of the necessity for the power here
sought to be exercised appeared in the President's delegation of his authority under
§ 5(b) to the Alien Property Custodian. Exec. Order No. 9193, 7 FED. REG. 5205 (1942).
Under this Order the Custodian was empowered to vest property only when he deemed
such action was in the national interest.
22. Exec. Order No. 8389, 5 FED. REG. 1400 (1940); for a collection of the execu-
tive orders and regulations, circulars and general rulings issued by the Treasury Depart-
ment in this connection, see DocumENTs RELATING TO FOREIGN FUNDS CoNmoL (U.S.
Treas. Dep't 1944); for a detailed analysis of the freezing program, see Reeves, The
Control of Foreign Funds by the United States Treasury, 11 LAW & CoNMrP. PRoD.
17 (1945).
23. Section 5(b) and Exec. Orders No. 9095 and 9193 issued pursuant to § 5(b).
See also Myron, The Work of the Alien Property Custodian, 11 LAw & CONTEMP. PaOD.
71 et seq. (1945).
24. 55 STAT. 742 (1941), 50 U.S.C. WAR App. §§611-32 (Supp. 1942).
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If in spite of these additional controls the Supreme Court should affirm the
need and with it the power to retain friendly alien property, the constitu-
tionality of the government's construction might still be challenged under the
Fifth Amendment. Three questions must be resolved: (1) is an alien friend
within the protection of the Fifth Amendment; (2) does this protection
include a guarantee against discriminatory legislation; and (3) is Section
5 (b) discriminatory through its application to a particular class of individuals
rather than to particular property.
The answer to the first question would seem to be dearly in the affirmative.
The right of an alien to procedural due process has long been recognized.p
More recently, in Russian Voluntecr Flect v. Unitcd States,:- the Supreme
Court held that an alien friend is guaranteed substantive due process as well
and must receive just compensation where his property is taken by the govern-
ment. It would thus seem that Ubersee should have no difficulty in invoking
protection against outright confiscation. But whether the Fifth Amendment
prohibits discrimination as well as confiscation has never been decided. Un-
like the Fourteenth, it does not on its face guarantee to all persons equal
protection of the laws. It seems neither probable nor reasonable, however,
that a discriminatory state statute could be invalidated by the Fourteenth
Amendment while the constitutionality of a federal statute equally discrimina-
tory could not be questioned. The Supreme Court has indicated in dicta that
a federal statute which is grossly discriminatory would be subject to annull-
ment on the ground that it would be. equivalent to confiscation.- Moreover,
alien friends have been judicially accorded equal protection under the Four-
teenth Amendment. State statutes directed towards aliens of a particular
nationality,-8s and towards aliens as a class,2 have been held unconstitutional
on this ground, the decisions turningprimarily on the unreasonableness of the
classification. There would seem to be no logical reason for supposing that the
Fifth Amendment does not grant similar protection to alien friends. Con-
siderable dicta in cases relating to the World War I Act to the effect that con-
stitutionality of the seizure provisions would not have been sustained had
American citizens and alien fricnds not been provided with a judicial rem-
edy30 would seem to be in accord.
25. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263
U.S. 149 (1923).
26. 282 U.S. 481 (1931), cited uith approval, United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,
208 (1942).
27. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 48 (1936) and see DOWi G, CASES o.
CoNsT=Tio AL LAW 968 et seq. (1946) for a discussion of this interpretation of the
Fifth Amendment.
28. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1885).
29. Truex v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
30. In construing the 1917 Act the Supreme Court declared that "[the] dominant
purpose [of the statute] often recognized by this court, [is] to give to citizens and alien
friends an adequate remedy for invasions of their property rights in the exercise of the
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Assuming that alien friends are entitled to protection against discrimina-
tion, reasonableness of the classification in Section 5(b) must be determined.
This, in turn, would seem to depend primarily on whether the vesting of their
property was more necessary to the national interest than the vesting of the
property of American citizens. The argument that there is a greater pos-
sibility that a friendly alien may be a cloak for the enemy may justify dif-
ferent classification with respect to the immediate taking of property, but
hardly excuses its permanent retention where the alien can prove absence of
enemy taint.
The only question remaining for consideration is whether the view of Sec-
tion 5(b) adopted in the Ubersee decision, permitting recovery by alien
friends of non-enemy property, defeats the public policy underlying the Trad-
ing With the Enemy Act. This policy has been described by one court at as
designed to cripple the enemy's commerce, capture his property and decrease
his capacity for prolonging hostilities through the use of private resources.
To this traditional view should be added the broader Allied policy of render-
ing impossible a revival of Nazi power by the permanent destruction of the
German war potential.
32
The 1941 amendment of Section 5 (b) was not intended to change this basic
policy,33 nor would the Ubersee decision appear to place any obstacles in the
way of its complete realization. Delay in the liquidation of properties seized
war powers of the government. Any other constructionby denying such a remedy would
raise grave doubts of the constitutionality of the statute as applied to non-enemies."
Becker Steel Co. of America v. Cummings, 296 U.S. 74, 81 (1935). To the same effect,
see Garvan v. $20,000 Bonds, 265 Fed. 477, 479 (C.C.A. 2d 1920), in which the court
stated that "if persons not alien enemies, or allies of alien enemies were given no means
to protect their interests in such property the seizure would be unconstitutional as without
due process of law."
31. Standard Oil Co. v. Markham, 57 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). For earlier
judicial statements on the purposes of trading with the enemy legislation, see Miller v.
United States, 11 Wall 268 (U.S. 1870), and United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272
U.S. 1 (1926). See also ADMINISTRATION OF THE WARTIME FINANCIAL AND PIItORTY
CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 2-4 (U.S. Treas. Dep't, 1942).
32. Cox, Oscar, Resolution of the Mexican Delegation Dealing with the Problems
of Looted and Enemy Property, 12 DEP'T. STATE BULL. 350 (1945); Arts. 11 and 18 of
Tripartite Conference at Berlin, 13 DEs'T STATE BULL. 153 (1945) ; Final Act of Inter-
American Conferenwe on Systems of Economic and Financial Control of July 10, 1942,
37 AMER. J. OF INT. L. Sue. 9 (1943).
33. The brief debate in Congress on the First War Powers Act, Title III of which
embraced the amendment to § 5(b), was hurried and somewhat confused. Several mem-
bers' of the House, including those who had considered the bill in committee, clearly re-
garded the section as applying only to enemy property. Mr. Summers, chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee and sponsor of the bill, in response to a question from the
floor as to the scope of the amendment, replied that it was simply a section dealing with
alien enemies. 87 CONG. REC. 9859 (1941). See also remarks of Mr. Fish to the same
effect. Id. at 9856. Mr. Hancock declared that the section empowered the President to
seize all alien property and that the power was necessary in order to permit the seizure
of property "bound for some neutral country which it is expected will eventually reach
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by the Custodian34 and the difficulties involved in proving enemy ownership"
are possible disadvantages involved in permitting alien friends to sue for the
return of their property. They would seem to be overshadowed, however, by
the serious repercussions on American foreign policy3 which might result
from the denial of such a right to an alien friend. Not only would such a
denial appear contrary to international lawv, 37 but in so far as alien friends
are put in a position inferior to American citizens it would be contrary to
the enemy." Id. at 9861. The debate in the Senate was even more cursory, and the only
explanation of the bill was that given by Senator Van Nuys, a member of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, who stated that "in a nutshell the bill grants to the President the
same war powers exercised during World War I, in provisions for seizure and freezing
of alien property the bill goes further and not only freezes but seizes property." Id. at
9837.
34. By the terms of § 9 (a), the institution of a suit for the recovery of property
automatically precludes the Custodian from disposing of the property until termination
of the suit Mr. Markham, the Alien Property Custodian, appearing before the House
Judiciary Committee, pointed out that the sale of vested property, which is the prime
objective of the Alien Property Custodian's Office, would be considerably hampered by
permitting 9(a) suits by alien friends, and hence liquidation of the Office would be in-
definitely postponed. Hearings 6ef ore Subcommittee No. 1 of Committee on the Judiciary
on H.R. 5089, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. 7 (1946).
35. During the hearings before the House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 6890, rep-
resentatives of the Department of Justice strongly urged that no suits for the return of
vested property by alien friends be permitted because of the difficulties in securing pro-
bative evidence of enemy ownership. The force of this argument would seem to be weak-
ened by the fact that § 5(b) shifts the burden of proof of non-enemy taint to the claim-
ant; by the greater availability of evidence through the relaxation of foreign ban!:
secrecy laws [see Swiss Decree of May 29, 1945, 61 A.,rucuE SA, MM.u, G 331 (1946)] ;
and by the interchange of information relating to enemy resources provided for in agree-
ments concluded recently with neutral countries. For the text of agreement with Switzer-
land see Negotiations on Gernan Holdings in Switzerland 14 DEP'T STATr Buui. 1121
(1946), and with Sweden, 15 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 174 (1946). For a brief description of
the sources of information available to the Office of Alien Property Custodian in un-
covering German ownership of property, see Myron, The Work of the Alien Property
Custodian, 11 LAw & CoxNTm,. PRoB. 76, 78-9 (1945).
36. Secretary Byrnes has indicated the possible effects of this action on current
attempts to protect American investments abroad. See note 39 infra. In addition, the
position of the United States as the proponent of democracy and champion of minority
rights could not fail to be affected.
37. Doubts have been raised as to the right under international law to confiscate even
enemy private property in time of war. A fortiori, the confiscation of friendly private
property would be contrary to international law. I CALvo, DIcnoNNAInR D Drorr I:-
TE ATIONAL 295 (1885) ; LAWRENCE, PRiNCxu.Es or INTaxATIONAL LAw 404 (Win-
field ed. 1923) ; II OPPENrEMI, INTFRNATIONAL LAw 261 (Lauterpacht ed. 1940) ; III
HYDE, INTmxR ATIoNAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTmRPRErED AND APPLIED By THE U-iTD
STATES 1735 (1946). This is important to note since it is equally well established that in
all cases to which international law is applicable, municipal enactments ought not to be
contrued so as to violate international law, if any other construction is possible. Murray
v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64 (U.S. 1804); 2 Dod. 210 (Eng. Adm. 1819).
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traditional American policy.38 Furthermore, it would seriously embarrass the
State Department in its efforts to protect American investments abroad from
arbitrary and discriminatory treatment by foreign governments.8 D Finally, as
the court in the Ubersee case pointed out,40 "it can not be urged that Congress
intended to jeopardize, without adequate remedy, the billions of dollars of
Allied and friendly nations' property merely because of its temporary presence
in this country in time of war."
The view of Section 5 (b) and 9 (a) adopted in the Ubcrsee case, permitting
alien friends to sue for the return of their property, would thus seem to ac-
cord more faithfully with legislative intent, constitutional principles and en-
lightened self-interest than the interpretation placed on those sections in the
Silesian-American case.
PRE-INDICTMENT SUPPRESSION OF INVALID
CONFESSIONS*
Ever since disclosure of the details of Lillburn's Trial1 led to the demise of
the Court of Star Chamber,2 protection of the accused from coerced admis-
sions of criminal guilt has been a basic tenet of Anglo-American law. In
the federal courts of the United States, the Fifth Amendment to the Con-
38. The United States has consistently bound itself by treaty to accord to all aliens
resident within its jurisdiction the right to access to American, courts, to that degree of
protection for their persons and property required by international law, and to just
compensation and due process of law if their property should be taken. See, e.g, Article
1 'of the Convention of Friendship with the Swiss Confederation concluded in 1850, 11
STAT. 587 (1850) ; Article 1 of the Treaties of Friendship and Commerce with Germany,
44 STAT. 2132 (1923) ; Estonia, 44 STAT. 2397 (1925) ; Hungary, 44 STAT. 2441 (1925) ;
Latvia, 45 STAT. 2641 (1928); Norway, 47 STAr. 2135 (1928); Poland, 48 STAT. 1507
(1931) ; and Finland, 49 STAT. 2659 (1934).
39. This point was strongly urged in a letter by Secretary of State Byrnes to the
Judiciary Committee of the House at the time it was considering H.R. 5089. Hearings
before the Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5089, 79th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 28-9 (1946). Byrnes pointed out that the clause eliminating the right of
an alien friend to sue for the return of his property "carries a grave threat to the
property of American nationals in foreign countries and to the ability of the State De-
partment to obtain fair and equitable local treatment of such property interests of United
States nationals . . . to which the Department finds strong objection both on principle
and on grounds of the enlightened self interest of the United States."
40. 158 F.2d 313 (App. D.C., 1946), cert. granted, 67 Sup. Ct. 772 (1947).
* In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453 (C. C. A. 2d Feb. 25, 1947), reversing in part Application
of Fried, 68 F. Supp. 961 (S. D. N. Y. 1946), cert. granfed mib nora. United States
v. Fried, 15 U. S. L. W= 3475 (U. S. June 23, 1947).
1. 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (1637).
2. 16 CA. I., c. 10 (1640). See Wigmore, The Priilege Against Self-Critnmiation,
15 HA v. L. REv. 610, 624-6 (1902).
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stitution bars judicial insistence upon self-incriminating testimony. The
Supreme Court, however, not content with enforcing the minimal provi-
sions of the Constitution, has assumed the affirmative duty of prescribing
modes of criminal procedure appropriate to a democratic society. Within
this realm of conscious judicial policy the Court has, by its own acknowledg-
ment, "from the very beginning of its history, formulated rules of evidence to
be applied in federal criminal prosecutions." 4
To prevent police coercion of the suspect, the Supreme Court has pro-
scribed the introduction in evidence of confessions obtained through the
"third degree" not only in federal but also in state0 criminal trials. In Mc-
Nabb v. United States1 the Court attempted further to discourage the use of
the "third degree" in federal prosecutions8 by excluding confessions which,
while not demonstrably involuntary, were made to federal officers who had
failed to present the accused for arraignment with the celerity required by
statute.9 Similarly, the Court has held that where the Government has seized
the suspect's documents or other property in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment,"' federal courts must on timely motion suppress the use and require the
return of such evidence, regardless of its relevance or credibility;U nor can
3. ". . IN]or shall any person ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself .....
4. McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 341 (1943).
5. The use of "third degree" confessions as evidence in federal trials violates the
Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. Brain v. United States, 163 U. S.
532, 542 (1897). See Wan v. United States, 266 U. S. 1, 14-5 (1924) ; ef. Wilson v. United
States, 162 U. S. 613, 623 (1896).
6. The use of such confessions as evidence in state trials violates the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause. Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 (1945) ; Ashcraft
v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944) ; White v. Texas, 310 U. S. 530 (1940).
7. 318 U. S. 332 (1943).
& The McflVabb rule does not apply to state trials. Id. at 340, 347.
9. 28 STAT. 416 (1894), as amended, 31 STAT. 956 (1901), 18 U. S. C. § 595 (1940).
10. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
11. The Court arrived at this position only after a circuitous judicial journey. In
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), where the Court invalidated a federal statute
providing for the subpoena of personal records in a forfeiture proceeding, dictum of the
a fortiori variety suggested that evidence seized without a warrant was clearly inadmissible,
id. at 633, a departure from the established common-law rule that courts will not question
the legality of acquisition of otherwisq competent evidence. Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511,
28 S. E. 624 (1897); see Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Mete. 329, 337-8 (Mass. 1841). The
issue was not relitigated before the Court for eighteen years; then, in Adams v. New York,
192 U. S. 585 (1904), the Court, although holding the challenged seizure not unconstitu-
tional, appeared by dictum inserted arguendo, id. at 594-9, to repudiate the dictum of the
Boyd case. The Adams decision was thought to have buried what seemed at most a mo-
mentary heresy. See United States v. Wilson, 163 Fed. 338, 340-4 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1903).
Ten years later, however, in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914), Justice Day
explained for the unanimous Court that his opinion in the unanimous Adams decision had
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the Government thereafter subpoena evidence recovered pursuant to such mo-
tion.12  The Court in the first episode of Nardone v. United Statrsaa ex-
tended this doctrine by excluding as evidence recordings of telephone conver-
sations where the tapping of wires, although constitutional, 14 violated a
federal statute;1r6 subsequently the Court held inadmissible evidence clearly
derived from such recordings-the "fruit of the poisonous tree."10
In fashioning the pre-trial motion to suppress tangible evidence, the Court
sought simultaneously both to preclude the use at trial of illegally procured
evidence and to prevent the interjection at trial of the dilatory defense of
inadmissibility. More recently the Court has sanctioned consideration of
the motion prior to indictment,17 thus forestalling the injury of false indict-
ment and the expense of fruitless grand jury proceedings. In compelling the
exclusion at trial of illegally acquired confessions, however, the Court has
not been called on to determine the propriety of their pre-trial suppression;
and inferior federal courts are not in harmony.18 The Court in reviewing
merely precluded the litigation of illegal seizure at trial, and that unconstitutionally seized
evidence was inadmissible where a motion to suppress was made in advance of trial. Sub-
sequently the Court permitted exclusion at trial where the defendant had no knowledge of
the unlawful seizure until the introduction of the evidence at trial, Gouled v. United States,
255 U. S. 298, 305 (1921), or where a pre-trial motion to suppress had been erroneously
overruled. Id. at 312-3; Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313 (1921). Conceptually the
doctrine of exclusion rests on the theory that the use at trial of evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment violates the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination. See Boyd v. United States, supra at 630-5. The privilege also bars com-
pulsion to testify before a grand jury. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 66 (1906). For a com-
prehensive view of the problem of "unreasonable searches and seizures," see Justice Frank-
furter's dissenting opinion in Harris v. United States, 15 U.S.L. WEE, 4492, 4495 (U. S.
1947). See generally, Wood, The Scope of the Constitutional Immunity against Searches
and Seizures, 34 W. VA. L. Q. 1 (1927) ; Nelson, Search and Seizure: Boyd v. United
States, 9 A. B. A. J. 773 (1923); Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Scizures, 34 HARv.
L. Rv. 361 (1921).
12. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920).
13. 302 U. S. 379 (1937).
14. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928). In 1942 the Court, with three
justices dissenting, expressly refused to overrule the Olmstead decision. Goldman v. United
States, 316 U. S. 129, 135-6 (1942).
15. 48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U. S. C § 605 (1940).
16. Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 341 (1939).
17. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344 (1931); see Cobbledick v.
United States, 309 U. S. 323, 328-9 (1940) ; Perlman v. United States, 247 U. S. 7, 12
(1918).
18. In United States v. Lydecker, 275 Fed. 976, 978 (W. D. N. Y. 1921), the court
denied a pre-trial motion to suppress an allegedly coerced confession, distinguishing the
pre-trial suppression of illegally seized tangible evidence on the ground that the former
motion went to the credibility of the challenged evidence and should therefore more ap-
propriately be entertained by the trial judge in the context of a fuller knowledge of the
case. However in Ah Fook Chang v. United States, 91 F.2d 805, 807-9 (C. C. A. 9th
1937), dismissal on the merits of a pre-trial motion to suppress an allegedly coerced con-
fession was affirmed without any suggestion that the remedy would have been unavailable
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In re Fried9 will consider the further and wholly novel question of whether
inadmissible confessions, like inadmissible tangible evidence, should be stricken
in advance of indictment.
The case arose in a federal district court on a motion to suppress confes-
sions-elicited by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation through
pre-arraigment interrogations lasting variously from four to eleven hours--
of four men ultimately presented for arraignment more than eighteen hours
after their allegedly invalid arrests. District Judge Rifkind, recognizing
the case as one of first impression, felt that -to suppress confessions before
indictment would be to introduce an anomalous remedy, since there is no
clearly established practice of suppressing invalid confessions betwveen in-
dictment and trial. This view overlooks the premise of the instant motion:
that the suspect has a justifiable interest in avoiding the indignity of indict-
ment by advance suppression of his invalid confession. One already under
indictment is adequately protected from the remaining legal hazard of con-
viction by his opportunity to exclude the invalid confession at trial.
Not willing, however, to ground his decision solely on the maintenance of a
questionably useful "legal symmetry," Judge Rifkind found in the alterna-
tive no adequate affirmative reason for increasing the quantity of pre-trial
litigation.2 0 He admitted that the pre-indictment suppression of tangible
evidence might arguably support the pre-indictment suppression of uncoerced
and hence presumably credible confessions which are inadmissible at trial
because "obtained in the course of some other violation of the confessor's
rights, such as unlawful search or delayed arraignment." 2 ' Believing, how-
ever, that most allegedly invalid confessions are challenged as products both
of coercion and of other illegality, and that the issues of credibility raised by
possible coercion are best settled at trial, Judge Rifkind rejected any distinc-
tion between types of confessions. Accordingly he dismissed the motion
without taking testimony on the merits of the confessors' allegations.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed in an opin-
ion by Judge Frank and a concurring opinion by Judge Learned Hand, hold-
ing over Judge Augustus Hand's dissent that "confessions shown to have
resulted from constitutional violations" may be suppressed.- To determine
had the confession been found involuntary. In United States v. Pollacd; 64 F. Supp. 554
(D. N. J. 1946), the court unquestioningly granted pre-trial suppression of a confession
and of seized documents where the federal officers were shown to have entered under color
of an invalid search warrant. It will be observed that the rationale of United States v.
Lydecker, supra, is inapplicable to the type of confession suppressed in United States v.
Pollack, supra, or excluded in the McNabb case which, like illegally seized tangible evi-
dence, is inadmissible as evidence without reference to its inherent credibility.
19. 161 F. 2d 453 (C. C. A. 2d 1947), revcrs g in part, Application of Fried, 63 F.
Supp. 961 (S. D. N. Y. 1946).
20. Application of Fried, supra note 19, at 963.
21. Ibid.
22. 161 F. 2d 453, 460 (C.C.A. 2d 1947).
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the constitutional validity of the confessions the cause was remanded for ap-
propriate findings.23 It appears from the confessors' affidavits that any or
all of the arrests may have been invalid24 and hence in violation of the con-
fessors' right under the Fourth Amendment "to be secure in their persons
. . . against unreasonable searches and seizures. '25  Furthermore the delay
23. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review the reversal. United States v.
Fried, 15 U. S. L. W=zx 3475 (U. S. June 23, 1947).
24. The validity of the arrests of two of the confessors was litigated in the district
court pursuant to Judge Rifkind's consideration of a companion motion to suppress docu-
ments taken from the two on arrest. Judge Rifkind concluded that as a matter of
law the arrest warrant (naming all four confessors) was invalid, since the com-
plaint on which the wairant issued, set forth allegations of criminality based on the
complainant's mere "information and belief," Transcript of Record, p. 219, Fried v.
United States, 161 F. 2d 453 (C. C. A. 2d 1947), rather than on the requisite representa-
tion of the complaiiiant's factual knowledge. Darnall v. United States, 33 A.2d 734, 736
(Mun. App. D.C. 1943) ; accord, United States v. Pollack, 64 F. Supp. 554, 558 (D. N.J.
1946). See Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28, 29 (1927) ; Ripper v. United States, 178
Fed. 24, 26 (C.C.A. 8th 1910) ; United States v. Rykowski, 267 Fed. 866, 868 (S, D. Ohio
1920). Furthermore Judge Rifkind found as a fact that the arresting agents had no such
"probable cause" for believing that the two from whom the documents were taken had
committed a felony and were likely to escape unless apprehended as would alone justify
an arrest without a warrant. U. S. CoNsT. AmEND. IV; 48 STAT. 1008 (1934), as
amended, 49 STAT. 77 (1935), 5 U. S. C. § 300a (1940). [For a contemporary example of
judicial reluctance to find "probable cause," see Judge Learned Hand's opinion for the
court in United States v. Di Re, 159 F.2d 818 (C.C.A. 2d 1947) ]. Judge Rifkind decided,
however, to dismiss the motion to suppress the documents on the grounds that one of the
two arrested had consented to the seizure and had authority so to consent-a finding of
fact which the Second Circuit did not and could not disturb. United States v. Bianco, 96
F.2d 97, 98 (C. C. A. 2d 1938). The confessors failed to get certiorari from the Supreme
Court to review the Second Circuit's affirmance of the dismissal of the motion to suppress
the documents. 15 U. S. L. WEEK 3475 (1947). The theory of this petition for certiorari
was that one unconstitutionally detained through invalid arrest cannot by professed consent
to seizure of his documents make an intelligent waiver of his further constitutional right
to be secure in the possession of those documents, since such waiver is not to be lightly
assumed. See United States v. Hoffenberg, 24 F. Supp. 989, 990 (E. D. N. Y. 1938) ;
United States v. Ruffner, 51 F. 2d 579, 580 (D. Md. 1931). In estimating the validity of
the instant arrests it should be remembered that Judge Rifkind took testimony only as to
two of the arrests, and that even as to these two his determinations of invalidity were un-
necessary to his dismissal of the joint motions and are therefore not technically conclu-
sive.
25. It is not clear from the Second Circuit's decision in the Fried case that con-
fessions made subsequent to invalid arrest are necessarily "confessions shown to have re-
sulted from constitutional violations," within the meaning of Judge Frank's opinion, and
hence subject to pre-indictment suppression. Invalid arrest is a breach of the Constitution.
Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 5 (1927) ; Darnall v. United States, 33 A.2d 734,
736 (Mun. App. D. C. 1943). The concurring opinion of Judge Learned Hand indicates,
however, that he understood the Fried decision merely as extending the remedy of sup-
pression afforded "documents seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment" to "confes-
sions procured in violation of the Fifth Amendment." 161 F. 2d 453, 469 (C. C. A. 2d
1947). Read in this light, it would appear that the court's decision sanctions the suppres-
sion only of confessions procured through coercion, which violates the Fifth Amendment,
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in arraignment may not only have breached the letter of statutory commandco
and of the newly-adopted Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,' but may
see note 5 supra, and not of confessions procured through invalid arrest, which is a "viola-
tion of the... Fourth Amendment." Albrecht v. United States, Mspra at 5. It is to be
recalled that on a conceptual level unlawfully seized documents, although procured in vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment, have been suppressed only because their use as evidence
is held to violate the Fifth Amendments privilege against compulsion to give self-incrimi-
nating testimony. See note 11 supra. It is arguable, therefore, that an illegal seizure of
documents compels self-incrimination whereas a voluntary confession made subsequent to
an invalid arrest does not. On the other hand it may be argued that an invalid arrest is
itself so coercive as to make impossible an intelligent waiver of the suspect's constitutional
right to silence, in reliance on the same theory on which review was sought in the instant
case of the finding that one under invalid arrest could make effective consent to seizure of
his documents. See note 24 supra. The weakness of this argument is that the coarcive
effect of arrest is not magnified by an invalidity unknown to the suspect; and the Supreme
Court has repeatedly pointed out that a confession is not rendered inadmissible merely by
virtue of the fact that the confessor is under arrest. See Wan v. United States, 26 U.S.
1, 14 (1924) ; United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 157 (1923) ; Wilson
v. United States, 162 U. S. 613, 623 (1896); Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156
U. S. 51, 55 (1895).
If the meaning of the Second Circuit's holding in the Fried case is, however, to be
derived from Judge Frank's opinion for the court, it may readily be urged that confes-
sions made subsequent to invalid arrest are "confessions shown to have resulted from con-
stitutional violations," in the sense that the confession would not have been made absent
the precedent (unconstitutional) arrest and detention. In the McNabb case, for e.'nmple,
the mere priority in time of the unlawful delay in arraignment made the subsequent con-
fessions inadmissible. See United States v. Mitchell, 322 U. S. 65, 70 (1944). This causal
connection was made clear in United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105 (C. C. A. 2d 1945),
where a confession was attacked on the grounds of the alleged invalidity of the precedent
arrest. Judge Learned Hand found the arrest valid, but he first explained vith care the
reason for determining the arrest's validity: "... . it is a reasonable--indeed an inevitable
-inference that the admission resulted from the arrest in the sense that Cryne would not
have answered, had he not been in custody. For that reason the lawfulness of the arrest
becomes relevant." Id. at 106. In Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F2d 690 (App.
D. C. 1940), the trial court had admitted a confession made voluntarily to federal officers
who entered the defendant's home without permission or a search warrant. Chief Justice
Vinson, then an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
wrote the opinion of reversal which held that the officers had trespassed in violation of
the Fourth Amendment: "The Amendment does not outline the method by which the pro-
tection shall be afforded, but some effective method must be administered; the protection
granted by constitutional provisions must not be dealt with as abstractions. A simple, ef-
fective way to assist in the realization of the security guaranteed by the IVth Amendment,
in this type of case, is to dissolve the evidence that the officers obtained after entering and
remaining illegally in the defendant's home." Id. at 695.
26. "'... IT]he person arrested shall be taken immediately before a committing offi-
cer." 48 STAT. 1008 (1934), as amended, 49 STAT. 77 (1935), 5 U. S. C. §30a (1940).
27. "An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any
person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unneces-
sary delay before the nearest available commissioner or before any other nearby officer
empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United
States." FE. R Cuni. P., 5 (a).
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also have led to interrogation which was so overtly terroristic 8 or at least
so "inherently coercive '29 as to violate the Fifth Amendment.
Judge Frank's opinion met and squarely overruled the Government's prin-
cipal contention, warmly supported by Judge Augustus Hand, that pre-in-
dictment suppression of invalid confessions represented an inappropriate
extension of a rule designed to safeguard the accused's property rights in
personalty unlawfully taken. It is apparent that Rule 41(e),80 pursuant to
which motions to suppress are entertained, was drafted to formalize the
remedy for the unlawful seizure of "tangible objects,"8 1 and that the Rule
is "a restatement of existing law and practice. '8 2 However, as Judge Frank
pointed out, the Rule explicitly provides for the suppression as evidence of
objects to whose return the suspect is not entitled because, although illegally
taken, they are "otherwise subject to lawful detention. s83 The Supreme
Court has made it abundantly clear that a suspect's right to possession of
evidence is not decisive of his right to its suppression; the policies dictating
the exclusion of evidence "make the criterion of immunity not the ownership
of property but the 'physical or moral compulsion' exerted" by the United
States to obtain such property.
3 4
An injudicious appeal to history was also the basis of Judge Augustus
Hand's alternative dissenting argument that the Supreme Court's adoption of
the pre-trial motion to suppress was calculated not to benefit the suspect but to
protect the Government at trial from the surprise defense of inadmissibility.
That the Court was primarily so motivated is at least questionable.8 5 But,
28. Each of the four confessors alleged that he had been threatened during his inter-
rogation. Transcript of Record, pp. 6, 15, 19, 21, Fried v. United States, 161 F. 2d 453
(C. C. A. 2d 1947). Whatever type of pressure is applied, a confession which is demon-
strably involuntary is inadmissible at a federal criminal trial. See Wan v. United States,
266 U. S. 1, 14-5 (1924) ; Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613, 623 (1896).
29. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 154 (1944). There the Court held that the
mere lapse of time between arrest and arraignment-in that case, thirty-six hours--could
in combination with continuous interrogation and lack of sleep be so coercive as to obvi-
ate the need for proof of specific instances of inducement or intimidation.
30. FED. R. Cum. P.
31. Id., Rule 41(g).
32. FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WITH NOTES AND INSTITUTE PROC=z-
INGS (1946) 70.
33. FED. R. Cnm. P., 41(e).
34. Perlman v. United States, 247 U. S. 7, 15 (1918). The distinction becomes im-
portant where the property is contraband: thus the Government need not return but can-
not introduce in evidence illegally seized equipment for the unlawful manufacture of
liquor. United States v. Rykowski, 267 Fed. 866 (S. D. Ohio 1920). Cf. Cheng Wai v.
United States, 125 F.2d 915 (C.C.A. 2d 1942).
35. Scholarly analysis suggests that the Court's holding in Weeks v. United States,
232 U. S. 383 (1914), that the admissibility of documents seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment could be challenged by appropriate pre-trihl motion, was primarily a device
for distinguishing Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904), in which the Court had
reverted from the dictum of Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630-5 (1886) to the
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assuming the analysis to be correct, the Government is not necessarily less
surprised by the exclusion of a confession it has unlawfully extracted than
by the exclusion of documents it has unlawfully seized. Expanding the scope
and hence the efficacy of the motion to suppress would implement the Gov-
ernment's protection against surprise-a utility which is not vitiated by the
fact that the motion incidentally benefits the litigant who brings it into play.
The Government's supplementary contentions--that indictment under a
confession inadmissible at trial is no injury, and that suppression of such con-
fessions will needlessly multiply litigation-likewise lead to inacceptable con-
clusions. On the one hand the Government is forced to admit an interest in
the indictment of those it may have no present expectation of convicting.o
On the other hand determination of a confession's admissibility after a trial
has begun runs afoul of the Supreme Court's recent injunction that "timely
steps must be taken to secure judicial determination of claims of illegality on
the part of agents of the Government in obtaining testimony," since "[t]o in-
terrupt the course of a trial for such auxiliary inquiries impedes the momen-
tum of the main proceeding and breaks the continuity of the jury's atten-
tion." -ar Both contentions, furthermore, can be urged as appropriately and
to as little avail against the pre-indictment suppression of tangible evidenceSP
Judge Frank would have gone further and sanctioned the suppression not
only of confessions which are obtained in violation of the Constitution, but
also of those which are obtained in violation of statute and hence are inad-
missible at trial under the McNabb rule. But to this Judge Learned Hand
could not agree. Feeling "too much the force of consistency" to deny sup-
pression merely because of the intangible nature of a confession, he never-
theless circumscribed the remedy by limiting its application to direct breaches
of the Constitution.39
There is no readily apparent reason for Judge Learned Hand's distinction.
To the extent that he shared Judge Augustus Hand's anxiety over the pos-
sible multiplicity of dilatory motions, the short.answer would seem to be that
common-law rule that the source of inherently credible evidence is irrelevant to its admis-
sibility at trial. 8 WIGmOpE, Evmz: cz § 2184 n.1 (c) (3d ed. 1940) ; cf. id. at § 2183. See
Grant, Constitutional Basis of the Rule Forbidding the Use of Illegally Sciced Evidcnce,
15 So. CAI. L. Rzv. 60, 62 (1941). See note 11 mupra.
36. If the Government cannot obtain an indictment without reliance upon a confession
concededly inadmissible at trial, it a fortiori does not have enough evidence other than the
confession to get a conviction, since the Government's burden of proof at trial is at least
equal to and normally greater than its burden of proof before the grand jury.
37. Nardone v. United States, 303 U. S. 338, 341-2 (1939).
38. The Government also urged the reductio ad absurdism that pre-indictment sup-
pression of invalid confessions would compel pre-indictment suppression of the Govern-
ment's potential use of hearsay or otherwise incompetent evidence. The argument misre-
presented the confessors' position, which is that consistency demands pre-indictment deter-
mination in respect to confessions of exactly the issue customarily determined in repect
to tangible evidence-the legality of the Government's acquisition thereof.
39. 161 F. 2d 453, 465 (C. C. A. 2d 1947).
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the parent McNabb rule, which tests a confession's admissibility at trial on
the very statutory violation at issue in the instant case,40 has itself produced
far more furor than litigation.41 Indeed, the court's compromise would
seem to compel the marking-out of an area of self-duplicating litigation which
might have been avoided 'had the new remedy been shaped to suppress all
illegally acquired confessions. Issues of constitutional and statutory viola-
tion are generally intermingled in cases of challenged confessions, and federal
courts must now assume the pre-indictment burden of disentangling the dif-
ferent strands of illegality.4 2 Thus under the Fried rule the court must take
testimony on and then dismiss the pre-indictment motion of one who alleges
coercive detention but proves only an illegal delay in arraignment-even
though repetition of the same proof at trial will make ultimate exclusion of
the confession mandatory.
Questions of practicality aside, Judge Learned Hand may have thought that
limiting pre-indictment suppression to unconstitutional confessions would
make the new remedy the precise conceptual equivalent of the pre-indictment
motion to suppress tangible evidence, since only unconstitutionally seized
tangible evidence has heretofore been suppressed prior to indictment. But
to fashion the new procedure so closely upon the conceptual pattern of the old
would be to stress the incidental and ignore the essential purposes of the
remedy. The fact is that unconstitutional seizure is the only kind of illegal
acquisition which has resulted in the exclusion of tangible evidence at trial,
and there is therefore no recognized category of tangible evidence inadmis-
sible at trial by reason of its illegal source which cannot be suppressed before
indictment 3 Since confessions, by contrast, are excluded at trial when
40. The statutory violation proved in the McNabb case and alleged in the Fried case
was the arresting officers' delay in arraignment. Although there is a difference in wording
between the McNabb statute, 28 STAT. 416 (1894), as amended, 31 STAT. 956 (1901),
18 U. S. C. § 595 (1940), and that applicable in the instant case, 48 SrAT. 1008 (1934),
as amended, 49 STAT. 77 (1935), 5 U. S. C. § 300a, federal courts have interpreted these
and other arraignment statutes as requiring a uniform standard of compliance. Dession,
The New Federal Rides of Criminal Procedure: I, 55 YALE L. J. 694, 707 (1946). Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a), which requires that one arrested shall be arraigned
"without unnecessary delay," differs in wording from both these statutes; according to its
drafters, however, Rule 5(a) "supersedes all statutory provisions on this point. ..
NorES AND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, op. cit. supra note 32, at 7.
41. See Dession, supra note 40, at 712-3. For an exhaustive treatment of the practical
effect of the McNabb decision see Comment, Illegal Detention and the Admissibility of
Confessions, 53 YAIE L. J. 758 (1944).
42. Precisely because such issues are commonly inextricable, Judge Rifkind refused
to permit a more functional differentiation-pre-indictment litigation of a confession's le-
gality, and postponement until trial of the litigation of its credibility. See supra p. 1079.
43. If wire-tapping is conceived to be a seizure of tangible evidence, it must be con-
ceded to be an example of a seizure whose mere violation of statute renders the resultant
evidence inadmissible at trial. Conversely, however, classification of wire-tapping as a
seizure would appear to negate the proposition that the Supreme Court would hold pre-
mature a pre-trial or pre-indictment challenge to seized evidence grounded on an alleged
[VoI.561084
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acquired merely in violation of statute, it would seem not unlikely that Con-
gress and the Supreme Court have chosen to subject the use of this class of
evidence to a more exacting scrutiny. This policy the Second Circuit's
distinction in the Fried case does little to implement.44
The only explicit philosophic basis for the court's categorizing of confes-
sions is Judge Learned Hand's feeling that constitutional rights are entitled
to preferential treatment, "because of the higher respect" in which they are
held.45 If this superficially attractive proposition is to be given an operative
effect in the instant case, it should follow that justice is put in greater
jeopardy by indictments based on unlawfully seized documentary evidence
than by indictments based on a McNabb confession. But comparison of the
reasons which underlie exclusion of these two types of illegal evidence indi-
cates that admission of the latter is the more serious threat to the appropriate
administration of criminal law.
The exclusion as evidence of unconstitutionally seized documents is clearly
not a reflection upon the credibility of the documents. Rather it is a natural
concomitant of the privilege against self-incrimination, 0 and a declaration of
statutory violation. In 1942 the Court expressly approved the procedure of entertaining
a motion to suppress evidence allegedly obtained by wire-tapping at the opening of a trial
rather than after the taking of testimony had begun. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U. S.
114, 115 (1942). That the Court feels the trial's beginning to be the last rather than the
first appropriate moment for the initial entertainment of such a motion is indicated by the
fact that in a companion decision the Court affirmed without comment on the procedure
convictions which followed the dismissal on the merits of a pre-trial motion to suppress
evidence allegedly obtained by wire-tapping. Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129
(1942). It is to be noted that pre-indictment motions to suppress wire-tapping would
necessarily be infrequent, since wire-tapping is a form of evidentiary acquisition of which
the suspect is peculiarly unlikely to be aware in the early stages of a criminal prosecution.
44. The rationale of the McNabb decision ex-pressed for the Court by Justice Frank-
furter suggests that inferior federal courts should adopt a more affirmative concept of
judicial responsibility: "Legislation such as this, requiring that the police must with rea-
sonable promptness show legal cause for detaining arrested persons, constitutes an important
safeguard-not only in assuring protection for the innocent but also in securing convic-
tion of the guilty by methods that commend themselves to a progressive and self-confi-
dent society. For this procedural requirement checks resort to those reprehensible prac-
tices known as the 'third degree' which, though universally rejected as indefensible, still
find their way into use. .. A statute carrying such purposes is expressive of a general
legislative policy to which courts should not be heedless when appropriate situations call
for its application." 318 U. S. 332, 342-3 (1943). Since grand jury procedure is a form
of "judicial inquiry," Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 66 (1906), it would seem that federal
courts should not be "heedless" of opportunities to reform that procedure; judicial refusal
to enjoin the submission to grand juries of confessions obtained in disregard of a statute
would appear to violate the spirit of the McNabb rule by "making the courts themselves
accomplices in willful disobedience of law." McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 345
(1943).
45. 161 F. 2d 453, 465 (C. C. A. 2d 1947).
46. See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 466 (1932); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886).
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democratic policy that the United States will not meet crime with crime.
4 7
But this exclusion, although firmly established in the federal courts, is his-
torically a much criticized 8 departure from the common-law rule that courts
will not inquire into the legality of acquisition of evidence whose credibility is
not in question.4 9 The Court, in allowing states to admit such unlawfully
seized evidence, has indicated that exclusion is not a necessary component of
due process0 ° Likewise, states are at liberty to revoke the privilege against
self-incrimination,r1 since, in Justice Cardozo's words, "[j]ustice . . . would
not perish if the accused were subject to a duty to respond to orderly in-
quiry.
,2
By contrast, confessions which follow legal arrest and illegal delay in ar-
raignment may suffer no technical constitutional disability; but they are from
an evidentiary point of view far less reliable indices of truth than such uncon-
stitutional evidence as documents seized without warrant or even confessions
made immediately following invalid arrest. Lengthy pre-arraignment deten-
tion, as the Supreme Court recognized in Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
5 3 is itself
an aspect of coercion whose exercise increases the likelihood that resultant
confessions are a gauge of inducement and not a guide to truth 1 Thus con-
sidered, the confession adduced by unlawful detention is triply vulnerable: it
is doubtfully credible; it is the product of the Government's lawless act; and
it offers leeway, as the Court recognized in laying down the McNabb rule,
to the ultimate lawlessness of the "third degree."55
The McNabb rule, like the exclusion of evidence gained in violation of the
constitutional freedom from unlawful search and seizure and the constitu-
47. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 392 (1920).
48. See Judge Cardozo's opinion for the New York Court of Appeals in People v.
Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926), cert. denied, Defore v. New York, 270 U. S.
657 (1926) ; 8 WiGmomR, Evmzxcz §§ 2184, 2184a (3d ed. 1940).
49. Id. at §2183; see note 11 supra.
50. The Court, in Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904), refused to decide
whether the Fourth Amendment was binding on the states. In 1926, however, the New
York Court of Appeals expressly rejected the federal rule of exclusion laid down by
the Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914), and subsequent cases,
and held that the Fourth Amendment waR not binding on the states. People v. Defore, 242
N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926). The Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari. Defore v.
New York, 270 U. S. 657 (1926).
51. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908).
52. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 326 (1937). The classic criticism of the
privilege against self-incrimination is Jeremy Bentham's. 7 BENTHAM, WoRKs 445-68
(1843).
53. 322 U. S. 143 (1944).
54. Blackstone observed long ago that confessions uttered outside the court-room
"are the weakest and most suspicious of all testimony; ever liable to be obtained by arti-
fice, false hopes, promises of favour, or menaces; seldom remembered accurately, or re-
ported with due precision; and incapable in their nature of being disproved by other
negative evidence." 4 BL. CoMM. § 357.
55. See note 44 supra.
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tional privilege against self-incrimination, is binding only on federal courts.50
Unlike the two constitutional rules, however, the McNabb rule was devised
to implement the due process of law.6 7 However high the respect in which
the Supreme Court may hold other constitutional provisions, in defining due
process the Couft avowedly reaches "a different plane of social and moral
values."5 8 And it is on this plane that the Court anathematizes use of the
"third degree," since judicial reliance "upon confessions thus obtained would
make of the constitutional requirement of due process of law a meaningless
symbol. 59
The purpose of the McNabb rule was to curb even the potential use of the
"third degree" by holding confessions made subsequent to unlawful detention
inadmissible per se without requiring proof of overt breach of the Constitu-
tion. To enjoin the submission to a grand jury of confessions concededly
inadmissible at trial would seem the logical supplement to the McNabb rule
which might stop at its source the last inducement to "lawlessness in law en-
forcement."60  Academic observation that illegal police action invites civil
and criminal sanctions0 ' serves to emphasize the cognizable legal injury of
frivolous indictment, but ignores the fact that such sanctions are almost never
applied.6- The implied license to lawlessness inherent in a metaphysical dis-
tinction between a seizure of evidence which is unconstitutional and one
which is merely felonious may be met on a metaphysical level by recollection
that both the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall
56. See note S mspra.
57. It should be recalled that, conceptually speaking, "third degree" confessions are
barred by federal courts because they violate the Fifth Amendments privilege against
self-incrimination rather than the same amendments due process clause. See notes 5 and
25 supra. However in reviewing state criminal procedure the Court has assimilated the
ban on "third degree" confessions to the Fourteenth Amendments due process clause. See
note 6 .yupra. The Court makes no operative distinction between the tvo. See Ashcraft V.
Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 n. 9 (1944).
58. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 326 (1937).
59. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 240 (1940); see Lisenba v. California, 314
U. S. 219, 236-7 (1941).
60. See CHAFEr., PoL..A A=m STERx, REPORT o,; LAvw.ssziss ni LAw E.,-M -
MMNT (National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report 11, 1931).
61. 8 WiGoamo EvmzncE § 2184 (3d ed. 1940).
62. Judge Frank in the Fried case called attention to Chief Justice Vimson's careful
documentation of the fact that these sanctions are a dead-letter in the latter's opinion for
the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115
F.2d 690, 695 (App. D. C. 1940). The failure of these sanctions has been widely ob-
served. See Cr.m, FaR SPEEcH IN TE Urm STATzs (1941) 518-9; Atkinson, Ad-
ntissibilify of Evidnce Obtained through Unreasonable Scarches and Scires, 25 COm. L
Rav. 11, 22-3 (1925). The novelty of redress for unlawful police action is underlined by
the interest focussed on a damage suit currently being brought against agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation for illegal entry and seizure. Crv. Lm -rrs Q., March
1947, p. 2, col. 4.
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be the supreme Law of the Land. . ."6 For the purposes of the instant
case, the differential treatment accorded confessions of varying degrees of
illegality should vanish in the face of Justice Holmes' holding for the Court
that "the essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before
the court, but that it shall not be used at all.""
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE*
Federal Rule 19 adopts the equity rules on necessary joinder of parties.1
The broad requirement for necessary parties is their "joint interest," 2 the
determination of which has always been directed by two equity policies :3 (1)
A court will determine no person's rights unless he is present, and (2) com-
plete adjudication is desirable to avoid multiplicity of suits and to arrive at a
stable decree. An important qualification of these policies, particularly ap-
plicable to the federal courts4 and incorporated in Rule 19(b), is that the
court may proceed in an action without joining interested persons who are
outside the jurisdiction or whose joinder would destroy jurisdiction, if a
judgment can be rendered which will not affect their rights or liabilities.
63. U. S. CoNsT. Art. VI.
64. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 392 (1920).
* Calcote v. Texas Pacific Coal and Oil Co., 157 F.2d 216 (C. C. A. 5th 1946), cert.
denied, 67 Sup. Ct. 205 (1946).
1. The substance of 19(a), (b) and (c) is in Equity Rules 37, 39 and 25 respec-
tively, Notns To FED. R. Civ. P. 20 (1938). For full analysis and annotation of Rule 19,
see 2 Moore, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 2133-62 (1938) and Cumu. Surr. 29-55
(1946).
2. "(a) NECESSARY JOINDER. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23 [Class Actions]
and-of subdivision (b) of this rule, persons having a joint interest shall be made parties
and be joined on the same side as plaintiffs or defendants... ." The first sentence in
19(b), directed to joinder of necessary parties when there is no jurisdictional obstacle,
qualifies such parties as those "who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded
between those already parties." FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
3. CALvERT, PARTiEs To Suirs IN EQUITY 1 (1837) ; CLEPHANE, EQUITY PLEADINd
AND PRAcrlcn 20 (1926) ; 1 DANIELL, CHANCERY PRAcrICE 147 (8th ed. 1914) ; SnirMAN,
EQUITY PLEADING 13-4 (1897) ; STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS § 72 (10th
ed. 1892).
4. This qualification was follovNed by the early federal courts in equity proceedings,
STORY, op. cit. .icpra note 3, §§78-9; was partially enacted by Congress in 1839, 5 STAT.
321, REv. STAT. §737 (1875), now appearing in similar form in THE JUDICIAL CODE § 50,
28 U. S. C. §111 (1940) 1 and is more broadly stated in Equity Rule 39, formerly Rule 47
(1842). See HOPKINs, THE NEw FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 103-4, 242-6 (8th ed. 1933);
2 MOoRE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 2161-2.
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Persons in this category are generally referred to as "conditionally necessary"
parties. Interested persons are called "indispensable" and must be joined if
the judgment will affect their rights or liabilities," even if the consequence is
dismissal of the case.0
Failure carefully to follow Rule 19 (b) is illustrated by a recent Fifth Cir-
cuit case, Calcote v. Texas Pacific Coal and Oil Co.7 Lessors brought an
action against the lessee for cancellation of an oil and gas lease. Assignees of
three-fourths of the lessors' one-eighth royalty interest were not joined. The
lower court decreed confirmation of the lease on the ground that the lessors
had ratified it inter alia by conveying the royalty assignments.8 Although the
question was raised by neither the lower court nor the litigants," the appellate
court remanded the case because the royalty assignees' interest in the lease was
such that it might be injuriously affected upon either confirmation or cancella-
tion.
Joinder of assignees on either side of the case would have ended federal
jurisdiction, which was based on diversity of citizenship.10 The court's posi-
5. The classic statement on equity classification of parties by the federal courts was
rendered by Mr. Justice Curtis: "The court here points out three classes of parties to a
bill in equity. They are: 1. Formal parties. 2. Persons having an interest in the contro-
versy, and who ought to be made parties, in order that the court may act on that rule
which requires it to decide on, and finally determine the entire controversy, and do com-
plete justice, by adjusting all the rights involved in it. These persons are commonly
termed necessary parties; but if their interests are separable from those of the parties
before the court, so that the court can proceed to a decree, and do complete and final jus-
tice, without affecting other persons not before the court, the latter are not indispensable
parties. 3. Persons who not only have an interest in the controversy, but an interest of
such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting that interest, or leav-
ing the controversy in such a condition that its final termination may be wholly inconsist-
ent with equity and good conscience." Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130, 139 (U. S. 1854).
The classification of parties has become a confused subject in state courts mainly bz-
cause of lack of uniformity in the use of nomenclature, Comment, 29 CALw. L. RE. 731,
733 (1941); Note, 48 HARv. L. REV. 995, 996 (1935). The federal courts have largely
avoided this difficulty by the use of "necessary" to mean "conditionally necessary" and by
the use of "indispensable" to mean "absolutely necessary." Donma FED AL JuIsDxc'IoN'
AND Pocamupx 214-8 (1928) ; 2 MoonR, op. cit. supra note 1, at 2135-6; 1 STaur, Fna-
ERAL EQUiTy PRACrIcE §510 (1909); see Washington v. United States, 87 F2d 421,
427-8 (C. C. A. 9th 1936).
6. DoBIE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 218; 2 Afooa F, op. cit. supra note I, at 2160; Soay,
op. cit. supra note 3, §77; 1 ST=, op. cit. supra note 5, §§522, 533-4.
7. 157 F.2d 216 (C. C. A. 5th 1946). Judge Holmes wrote the opinion concurred in
by Judge Lee. Judge Hutcheson dissented.
8. Opinion unreported. Findings of fact, conclusions of law and final decree, Tran-
script of Record, pp. 311-5.
9. Objection to absence of indispensable parties is not waivable and may be intro-
duced as well by the court in any stage of the proceeding. Hoe v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 501
(U.S. 1869) ; McConnell v. Dennis, 153 Fed. 547 (C.C.A. 8th 1907) ; see I U. o7" Cur. L
Rv. 149 (1933) (state case). This is supported by Fa. R. Crv. P., 21; 2 Mo.-, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 2190; 13 RocKY MT. L. Rsv. 76 (1940).
10. Where federal jurisdiction depends solely on diversity of citizenship, any two
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tion was that, since jurisdiction depended on whether absent parties were
indispensable, that question had to be answered at the outset of the case. The
fact that absent parties may not have been prejudicially affected by the lower
court's judgment on the merits, it was held, was not controlling."- The court
therefore did not review the merits of the decision below and examined the
interests of the royalty assignees as if no decree had been made.
12
This emphasis on possible ouster of jurisdiction, while logical at first blush,
ignores the underlying theme of Rule 19(b). The Rule in terms makes the
determination of indispensable parties an exercise of a court's discretion; and
the long history of the similar doctrine in equity13 indicates that the control-
ling limitation on this discretion is whether or not, under the particular facts
of each case,' 4 absent parties will be adversely affected by non-joinder.10  It
has been considered well settled, moreover, that "equity will strain"10 to
parties from the same state on opposite sides would cause dismissal, 1 Moonn, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 481-2. Lessors' citizenship was Mississippi; lessee's Texas. While the citizen-
ship of the assignees was not a matter of record, by the time of the trial the royalty as-
signees included at least one Texan and one New Yorker, besides Mississippians. This
appears in the royalty transfers affecting the Calcote property, as shown by the Deed
Records of Franklin County, Mississippi, listed in Appendix 7 of Respondent's brief on the
petition for writ of certiorari.
11. 157 F.2d at 218.
12. The dissenting opinion emphasizes that the relief obtained in the lower court has
not prejudicially affected the interests of the absent parties. However, the opinion also
contends that even if they were indispensable parties, the failure to join them was not
reversible error. It appears that this is only a misuse of the word "indispensable," for,
once parties are determined indispensable rather than necessary, they must be joined or
the case dismissed; see Sneed v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 76 F.2d 785, 789 (C. C. A. 5th
1935) (dissenting opinion).
13. "We do not put this case upon the ground of jurisdiction, but upon a much broader
ground. . . . We put it on the ground, that no court can adjudicate directly upon a per-
son's right, without the party being either actually or constructively before the court."
Mallow v. Hinde, 12 Wheat. 193, 198 (U.S. 1827). The best case discussion of equity's
approach to this subject is by Justice Story in West v. Randall, 29 Fed. Cas. 718, 721-7,
No. 17,424 (C.C.R.I. 1820).
14. ". . . an entirely practical question dependent in each case on the facts." Roos v.
Texas Co., 23 F.2d 171, 172 (C. C. A. 2d 1927), cert. denied, 277 U.S. $87 (1928) ; Niles-
Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders Union Local 68, 254 U.S. 77, 80 (1920).
15. Waterman v. The Canal-Louisiana Bank and Trust Co., 215 U. S. 33, 48-9
(1909) ; Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 431 (U. S. 1868) ; The Mechanics Bank of Alex-
andria v. Louisa and Maria Seaton, 1 Pet. 299, 306 (U. S. 1828) ; Elmendorf v. Taylor,
10 Wheat. 152, 165 (U. S. 1825) ; Atwood v. National Bank of Lina, 115 F.2d 861, 863
(C. C. A. 6th 1940) ; Edenborn v. Wigton, 74 F.2d 374, 376 (C. C. A. 5th 1934), cert.
denied, 294 U. S. 719 (1935) ; Hazeltine Corp. v. White, 68 F.2d 715, 716-7 (C. C. A. 2d
1934) ; Rose v. Saunders, 69 F.2d 339, 340 (C. C. A. 9th 1934) ; Roos v. Texas Co., 23
F.2d 171, 172 (C. C. A. 2d 1927), cert. denied, 277 U. S. 587 (1928) ; Williams v. Crabb,
117 Fed. 193, 202 (C. C. A. 7th 1902), cert. denied, 187 U. S. 645 (1902) ; Norton v.
United Gas Corp., 1 F. R. D. 155, 161 (W. D. La. 1940).
1 16. Cole Silver Mining Co. v. Virginia and Gold Hill Water Co., 6 Fed. Cas. 72, 74,
No. 2,990 (C. C. Nev. 1871); West v. Randall, 29 Fed. Cas. 718, 723, No. 17,424 (C. C.
R. I. 1820) ; see Bourdieu v. Pacific Western Oil Co., 299 U. S. 65, 70 (1936).
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reach a decree non-prejudicial to absentees. Thus the trial judge may deny
without prejudice a preliminary motion to dismiss until such time as it may
appear that none of the alternative decrees consonant with the evidence could
be entered without injuring interested parties.' 7 At the end of the trial his
problem is to fashion the actual decree to conform to the merits and yet work
no injustice to absentees.' 8  Even a decree which leaves the controversy open
to further litigation is usually preferred to no settlement at afl,20 and the
decree may be framed especially to protect an absent party. ° Only if the
judge determines at any point in the trial that no satisfactory decree can be
devised does judicial discretion end; only then must the absentee be called
indispensable and the suit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.2'
Not only was the appellate court's approach in the Calcot case seemingly
out of line with the policy inherent in Rule 19(b), but there appears to have
been no reason in fact for the conclusion that the royalty assignees were in-
dispensable parties. The court reasoned simply that the assignees had a "dis-
tinguishable legal interest" in the royalties. 22 Even on this conceptual level it
The policy of straining to reach a decree appears to have resulted in the dispensability
of interested parties in the following suits to clear up oil and gas titles: Spring v. Ohio
Oil Co., 108 F2d 560 (C. C. A. 5th 1940) ; Tems Co. v. Wall, 107 F2d 45 (C. C. A. 7th
1939) ; Seeley v. Cornell, 74 F.2d 353 (C. C. A. 5th 1934) ; Colquitt v. Roxana Petroleum
Corp., 49 F.2d 1025 (C. C. A. 5th 1931) ; Federal Gas, Oil and Coal Co. v. Cassady, 56 F.
Supp. 824 (E. D. Ky. 1943) ; Ford v. Adkins, 39 F. Supp. 472 (E. D. IlL 1941) ; Lorton
v. United Gas Corp., 1 F. R. D. 155 (W. D. La. 1940); Charleston National Banh: v.
Oberreich, 34 F. Supp. 329 (E. D. Ky. 1940) ; Carter Oil Co. v. Wood, 30 F. Supp. 875
(E. D. IlL 1940). But cf. Keegan v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 155 F2d 971 (C. C. A.
5th 1946) ; Associated Oil Co. v. Miller, 269 Fed. 16 (C C. A. Sth 1920), cert. denied,
256 U. S. 697 (1921); Vincent Oil Co. v. Gulf Refining Co., 195 Fed. 434 (C. C. A. 5th
1912); South Penn Oil Co. v. Miller, 175 Fed. 729 (C. C. A. 4th 1909); McConnell v.
Dennis, 153 Fed. 547 (C. C. A. Sth 1907).
17. Currier v. Currier, 1 F. R. D. 683 (S. D. N. Y. 1941) ; Stuff v. La Budde Feed
and Grain Co., 42F. Supp. 493 (E. D. Wis. 1941).
If the court decides that the plaintiff does not state a cause of action, no inquiry into
the question of indispensable parties is necessary. Bourdieu v. Pacific Western Oil CoD,
299 U. S. 65 (1936). "This principle indiscriminately applied would be dangerous:' 2
MooSE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 2146 n.11.
18. S Oay, op. cit. suPra note 3, §§77, 79.
19. Waterman v. The Canal-Louisiana Bank and Trust Co., 215 U. S. 33 (1909);
*Williams v. Crabb, 117 Fed. 193 (C. C. A. 7th 1902), cert. denied, 187 U. S. 645 (1902);
MacBryde v. Burnett, 41 F. Supp. 661 (D. Md. 1941); Steingut v. National City Banl:
of New York, 38 F. Supp. 451 (S. D. N. Y. 1941) ; Sanuer v. Newhouse, 24 F. Supp. 911
(D. N. J. 1938).
20. Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 263 (C. C. A.
2d 1944) ; Oxley v. Sweetland, 94 F2d 33 (C. C. A. 4th 1938) ; Cole Silver Mining Co.
v. Virginia and Gold Hill Water Co., 6 Fed. Cas. 72, No. 2,990 (C. C. Nev. 1871) ; see
The Mechanics Bank of Alex-andria v. Louisa and Maria Seaton, 1 Pet. 299, 305 (U. S.
1828).
21. See note 6 supra.
22. 157 F. 2d at 220. For the property law on oil and gas royalties, see 3 Stu'sns,
Om. AxD GAS § 571-613 (Perm. ed. 1938) ; GLAssmamu, OIL AN GAs LrAsEs AD Roy-
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may be replied that since the controversy was limited to an alleged illegality
in the lease making status of the lessee, 23 and since the royalty deeds were
executed after the lease and made expressly subject to it, the assignees had no
legal interest in the case.2 4 The critical point, however, is that the facts do not
appear to substantiate prejudice to the assignees' interest from either cancella-
tion or confirmation of the lease.
25
If the lease had been cancelled, the lessors could not have decreased the as-
signees' interest by making a new lease, because the royalty deeds20 bound the
lessors to get at least a one-eighth royalty interest in any future lease. I-lad
the lessors wished to snuff out their assignees' royalty interests, they would
have had to postpone making a new lease until 1964 when the royalty grants,
upon no production, would expire. Such strategy would have been impractical
for the lessors; and it was definitely controverted by an allegation,"7 not
mentioned by the court, that a new lease2 8 had already been signed with a dif-
ferent lessee. Thus the interest of the assignees could not be injured by
cancellation of the old lease. Moreover, the district court's decree did not
cancel that lease.
Neither were their interests prejudiced by the decree of confirmation actu-
ally entered. The assignees would have received no advantages from the new
lease over the old one. Although the lessors' incentive for signing the new
lease was to be a bonus paid out of oil production and an increase in delay
rentals until production started, the assignees were prohibited by their deeds
from participating in bonuses, delay rentals or the making of new leases.
Finally, the lessors, the.only parties with anything to gain from reversal, not
only refrained from arguing that joinder was necessary, but expressly argued
on appeal that "whether this lease be good or bad will not affect the royalty
owner.
'"2
Apart from the particular provisions of the realty papers here involved,
L.rnrs (1935); Blake, Oil Royalties: A Suggested Criterion, 13 Miss. L.J. 307 (1941);
Levy, Oil Royalties-A Distihwt Species of Property, 11 So. CA~u. L. Rav. 319 (1938);
Comment, 17 Tax. L. Ray. 346 (1939).
23. The complaint alleged that the lessee corporation was not authorized to do busi-
ness in Mississippi at the time the lease was signed. Transcript of the Record, pp. 4-6.
24. "We conclude that the 'interest' referred to both in Rule 19 and the decided cases
is one which must be directly affected legally by the adjudication." Samuel Goldwyn, Inc.
v. United Artists Corp., 113 F.2d 703, 707 (C. C. A. 3d 1940) ; Chidester v, Newark, 58
F. Supp. 787, 792 (D. N. 3. 1945).
25. Where a voidable lease was ratified by the execution of the royalty grants, as in
the instant case, the royalty assignees were not parties; see Grissom v. Anderson, 125 Tex.
26, 79 S.W.2d 619 (1935) ; Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Clark, 87 S. W.2d 471 (Tex.
Com. App. 1935). But see Cummings v. Midstates Oil Corp., 193 Miss. 675, 9 So,2d 648
(1942). However, the question of joinder of absent parties does not appear to have been
raised in these cases.
26. Transcript of the Record, pp. 120-40.
27. Id. at p. 7.
28. Id. at pp. 10-19.
29. Additional brief for Appellants, p. 11.
[Vol. 561092
NOTES
there is inherent in the nature of oil and gas royalty transactions a practical
argument against compelling joinder of assignees. In the instant case the les-
sors' three assignments were further subdivided into about fourteen holdings by
the time of trial.P0 Such subdivision is customary, especially in the specula-
tive, pre-production period of an oil and gas lease.?' If royalty assignees were
generally to be held indispensable parties to suits between lessors and lessees,
an unwieldy procedure would be imposed on the royalty market?
-2
In holding that the determination of indispensable parties in a federal
diversity case was strictly jurisdictional, the court seems to have misconstrued
Rule 19(b). Moreover, even granting that the issue must be decided at the
outset of the case, the facts indicate that the absentees would not have been
prejudiced by either possible decision. On both counts reversal for vant of
indispensable parties appears erroneous.
30. As a result of nineteen transactions up to the time of the trial, no individual as-
signee had as large an interest as the lessors' one-fourth of one-eighth. These transactions
are listed in Appendix 7 of Respondent's brief on petition for writ of certiorari.
31. GLAssmmy, op. cit. supra note 22, §S4.
32. See Gypsy Oil Co. v. Champlin, 163 Okla. 226, 227, 22 P.2d 102, 104 (1933) (con-
curring opinion).
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